Revolution as Model or Metaphor?

In May, Der Spiegel interviewed Emmanuel Todd, who "sees himself as an 'empirical Hegelian' who recognizes a universal course of history," about the emergent Arab Spring. Both Der Spiegel and Todd ransacked European history for the appropriate comparative model. For Der Spiegel it was "a breathtaking acceleration of history, similar to the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989." For Todd it was the cycle of phases, or, more darkly, that a revolution eats its young:

• "Revolutions often end up as something different from what their supporters proclaim at the beginning.... It took almost a century from the time of the French Revolution in 1789 until the democratic form of government, in the form of the Third Republic, finally took shape after France had lost a war against the Germans in 1871. In the interim, there was Napoleon, the royalist restoration and the Second Empire under Napoleon III, the 'little one,' as Victor Hugo said derisively." (05/20/2011, "Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate: A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution," Der Spiegel)

That last comment is a conscious echo of Marx's observation that history repeats itself, "the first as tragedy, then as farce" (The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, 1852).  If France, 1789-1871, seems a bit broad, in the third part of the interview Todd expands to all of Europe in 1848.

• The Arab Spring resembles the European Spring of 1848 more closely than the fall of 1989, when communism collapsed. The initial spark in France triggered unrest in Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Austria, Italy, Spain and Romania -- a classic chain reaction, despite major regional differences. 

More recently, the Syrian Protests, which most viewed at best as a "revolutionary situation," has now become viewed as entering a second radical phase.  At least that is the claim of "The Age of the Guillotine!" (Syrian Revolution Digest, September 18, 2011): "Ideologies will soon flourish, and compromises will be harder to reach, even between the revolutionaries, pragmatism is now more necessary and harder to attain."  2011 as 1793?

Comparative Revolutions: Part Deux

How do we interpret "revolutionary situations" and "revolutionary outcomes" (to use the Charles Tilly's language, "Conflict, Revolt and Revolution,"  European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford, 1993), ch. 1) of recent and current rebellions? Avishai Margalit, in a piece analyzing current pundits on the Arab Spring, notes that we often do so by choosing the wrong historical revolution.  Margalit asks, "Why were the Arab revolutions, especially in Egypt, such a shocking surprise to almost all who care?"  His answer is often because we have only one, or only one main, historical example of a "revolution":

• "We are in the grip of an idea about revolutions. The idea is the Bolshevik model (or the Jacobin one, if we go back in time), according to which a revolution worth its salt is the outcome of a centralized organization that acts under a unified command.... This idea is dubious when applied to Russia in 1917, let alone to other revolutions. It holds true for Russia’s October Revolution, but it does not hold true for Russia’s February Revolution. The latter, like those in Egypt and Tunisia this year, lacked a central organization. ("From Ground Zero to Tahrir Square," by Avishai Margalit, Democracy, Issue #21, Summer 2011)

Not only is his point worth considering, surely choosing any of the "sloppy" early modern revolutions before 1789 would also allow use to make more informed comparisons about those not lead by a centralized cadre (and castigating Libya, or Syria, or Egypt for not having the thing that we pretended they needed to have in the first place).

Others continue to focus on the "social revolution" model.  Lawrence Wright notes of "the martyrs of the Arab Spring so far: Some 200...in Tunisia...[;] in Egypt...840...[;] More than a thousand...in Yemen....[;] in Syria, more than 2,200..."

• "The protesters are not just bringing about badly needed social revolutions in their societies. By their moral example, they are redefining Islam and redeeming it from the savage caricature that bin Laden made of his religion" (“Two Questions at the Heart of Bin Laden’s Jihad," by Lawrence Wright, Bloomberg”, Sept. 8, 2011)

Not just, but also.  Time to dust-off the social revolution model or at least make a working definition.

Social Media Revolution or Old-Fashioned Social Revolution?

The events of the Arab Spring (and the wider events of the Summer of 2011) draw analysts to the comparative.  Thus, the editors of the Middle East Report note "the Syrian revolt of 2011...is the nightmarish opposite of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionary dream." ("Syria's Torment," the Editors, Middle East Report, August 10, 2011, Middle East Research and Information Project) One of these is not like the other. Such comparisons are the bread-and-butter of all those who search for the independent variable, be they historical sociologists or political scientists.  But the comparative is a game that historians must play if they are going to use terms to describe what is going on.  (Is it a revolt, sire?...)  And, indeed, the analysts tend to draw from the ready-made language of historical, even European revolts, to understand the present.  Thus, the same Middle East Report: "No rustic jacquerie, the Syrian revolt has leaped from town to town." ("Syria's Torment,") (Are, then, protest videos posted to Youtube the new urban cahiers de doléances?)

It might seem that recent media-drenched revolts are tailor-made for the linguistic turn - deep cultural analysis of modes of discourse.  And certainly there were claims at the outset that the Medium is the Message:

• "Yet another Facebook revolution: why are we so surprised?," by John Naughton, The Observer, 23 January 2011
• "Faces of the Facebook Revolution," by Lenora Jane Estes, Vanity Fair, 4 April 2011
• "Why not call it a Facebook revolution?," by Chris Taylor, February 24, 2011, CNN
  

Just a partial listing, shows how this quickly devolved to a meer trope.  Naughton revealed the formula:

• "The story is always the same: something unexpected happens in the real world; journalists notice that some of the people involved are users of the web/mobiles/Facebook/Twitter (delete as appropriate); the unexpected is then labelled 'the Facebook/Twitter/smartphone (delete as etc) revolution/protest/demonstration/election'." ("Yet another Facebook revolution")

Instead, what has dominated analysis is state-centered analysis of social revolutions, the type that developed out of the 1960s and 1970s from Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, and Charles Tilly. For Skocpol, state situations, not revolutionary ideologies, are most determinative of successful revolutions which she distinguishes as fundamentally different from unsuccessful ones.

•  “Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below." Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (1979), 4

And Jeff Goodwin reiterates this definition in his "narrow" revolution definition below:

• "Two definitions of a revolution: a broad one, where revolution is 'any and all instances in which a state or a political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extraconstitutional and/or violent fashion'; and a narrow one, in which 'revolutions entail not only mass mobilization and regime change, but also more or less rapid and fundamental social, economic and/or cultural change, during or soon after the struggle for state power.'” Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 9, cited in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution.

What is intriguing is that the language of the state-centered analysis of social revolutions has returned to center stage. Anne-Marie Slaughter has recently drawn a number of "lessons" from recent events in Libya in the Financial Times. "The first is that, against the sceptics, it clearly can be in the US and the west’s strategic interest to help social revolutions fighting for the values we espouse and proclaim. The strategic interest in helping the Libyan opposition came from supporting democracy and human rights, but also being seen to live up to those values by the 60 per cent majority of Middle Eastern populations who are under 30 and increasingly determined to hold their governments to account. This value-based argument was inextricable from the interest-based argument." (Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Why Libya sceptics were proved badly wrong," Financial Times, August 24, 2011)  And there are many analyses of contemporary Arab "social revolutions": see for example "Social revolution in Tunisia and Egypt" (Steven Adolf and Sadik Harchaoui, Forum Report, 11 February 2011).  Is this another trope or a useful recognition of what is going on on the ground?  Perhaps it is best to note that the link between the state political and the social is a useful metaphor, then and now.

You write Khadafi, I write Qaddafi, Let's Call the Whole Thing....

Perhaps we will only need it for the history books now.  But, for the record: "A much-circulated 2009 ABCNews.com story found 112 different ways to render the Libyan leader's last name in the Latin alphabet, used in English and most other Western European languages. But, according to this passport, and presumably the Libyan man himself, the accurate Latinized spelling is one of the least commonly used of those 112: Gathafi." (Max Fish, The Atlantic, August 24, 2011, "Rebel Discovers Qaddafi Passport, Real Spelling of Leader's Name")

Surely Juan Cole Deserves Some Credit Too

Tripoli, 22 August (see Immoral Minority, etc.)

Great article by Juan Cole ("Top Ten Myths about the Libya War," 08/22/2011, Informed Comment) who surely gets to take a bow for not only supporting Libyan FF, but supporting the limited air support by the US/UK/France/Nato since before its inception.  From my, admittedly circumscribed view, I would only question 2 of his myths:

1. " The United States led the charge to war. There is no evidence for this allegation whatsoever."  Doesn't this go against the Lizza, New Yorker article which stated, some months ago: "Nonetheless, Obama may be moving toward something resembling a doctrine. One of his advisers described the President’s actions in Libya as 'leading from behind'"? ("The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy," by Ryan Lizza, New Yorker, May 2, 2011)  Lizza's article (and the adviser) might be wrong, but I don't recall Mr. Cole taking them to task earlier.
2. "The Libyan Revolution was a civil war. It was not, if by that is meant a fight between two big groups within the body politic."  This is more a judgement call.  Charles Tilly's definition of a revolution is when two groups of elites appeal to non-elites and the two blocks fight to control state apparatus.  In a revolutionary situation,civil wars often are a stage.  That appears to have happened over the past few months.  I think Cole rightly wants to show that Qaddafi's support among non-elites was not that strong.  I agree.  But, for as long as it lasts, I think we can term this a civil war, because Qaddafi did have some, if limited, support

Those are my caveats to an otherwise outstanding string of great articles on Libya.  Which is why Informed Comment is on My Blog List to the left of this blog.

So What Will Green Square Be Called Next Week? (Update: That was quick, now we know)
From ABC

• Rebel forces are surrounding the Gadhafi compound, Bab al Aziziya, a representative of the rebel government told ABC News.
• Mohamad al Akari, a Transitional National Council advisor, said that if Libyan strongman Moammar Gadhafi is still in Tripoli, they believe he is in Bab al Aziziya.
• "Tonight it's over," Akari said.
• Libyan rebel forces are now in Green Square in the heart of Tripoli, according to multiple reports, clashing with government forces. ("Libyan Rebels Say They Have Captured Two of Gadhafi's Sons in Tripoli," by OLIVIA KATRANDJIAN and JEFFREY KOFMAN, ABC News, Aug. 21, 2011)

Update: "Libyan rebels: Unit protecting Gadhafi surrenders," by KARIN LAUB, Associated Press, Updated: 6:36 p.m. Sunday, Aug. 21, 2011)

• TRIPOLI, Libya — A senior rebel official says the military unit in charge of protecting Moammar Gadhafi and the capital Tripoli has surrendered.
• Mahmoud Shammam, the rebel minister of information, told the Associated Press on Sunday that the unit commander "has joined the revolution and ordered his soldiers to drop their weapons."

Update 2: It turns out it has now been renamed, at least in the popular mind, from Green to Martyrs' Square!  That was quick.

Map and Video Show the Rapid Change in Libya

Al Jazeera Maps the Progress of Freedom Fighters in Libya


While an impromptu street demonstration in Tripoli (Al-Dhul Street August 21, 2011) suggests the rapidity (fluidity?) of the change.

"Is it a Revolt?"  "No, Sire, It is a Revolution."


I'm not sure even blogs can keep up.  Sky News Live with its 5 minute news updates might be needed to keep abreast of the race to Gate 27 and beyond.  almost certainly they have seized Mayah, passing Tripoli's defense ring, and moved into parts of the capital from the West.  And the East?

The Latest from NYTimes Lede Blog:

• 5:14 P.M. | Rebels Claim to Capture Qaddafi's Son, Seif al-Islam. The head of Libya's rebel government, the National Transitional Council, just told Al Jazeera that Seif al-Islam el-Qaddafi, the Libyan leader's influential son, has been captured, Reuters reports....
• 4:57 P.M. | Qaddafi's Guards Reportedly Surrender.  Although there is no word yet on where Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi is, the rebel leadership in Benghazi told Al Arabiya that his security guards have surrendered, Reuters reports.

Time and the Devil...: The Map Tells a Tale in Western Libya

17 August 2011

17 March 2011

This map (left), via Informed Comment (courtesy Iyad Elbaghdadi), gives an idea of what Col Ghaddafi is up against in Western Libya ("Qaddafi Explores Routes to Flee Libya as Rebels Advance," 08/18/2011 by Juan Cole).  Contrast it with the, admittedly more schematic, map to the right (below) from exactly five months earlier.  The story has been one of small villages and crossroads.  But the mountain ridge in the interior is now almost entirely filled with the flags of the opposition TNC.  And now the routes to Tripoli from the West and the South are at the very least contested.  (Juan Cole also reports, "[i]n Sabratha to the west of Zawiya, the Free Libya forces not only completely subdued the city but they also captured the military base and transferred to themselves all the weapons in it.") Most Libyans live in Tripoli and the situation there is uncertain.  But the map suggests the outcome no longer is.

Now: Zawiyah, 18 August 2011

Then: Zawiyah, 11 March 2011

And the latest?: "Libya rebels seize Zawiyah oil refinery." (Aug 18, 2011, by Ulf Laessing and Yvonne Bell, National Post)

Crowdsourcing Fasfous and Mukhabarat

Notes on the Secret Police (mukhabarat) and Informants (fasfous) inside and outside Syria, even from form Mukhabarat themselves:

• Among [those fleeing from Syria to Turkey] last week was a 25-year-old officer with the Mukhabarat secret police, who described how officers were increasingly unhappy at being ordered to kill unarmed protesters.
• "They were all feeling like me. They were all afraid like me but knew they would be killed if they left or if they refused orders," he said.
• Instead they tried to aim their shots in the air.
• He also described bringing protesters – some as young as 13 – into police stations where they were beaten for the entertainment of senior officers. ("Iran snipers in Syria as part of crackdown," Rob Crilly, from Yayladagi, near the Turkish-Syrian border, 15 Aug 2011, The Telegraph)

This particular former Mukhabarat had not revealed his identity to fellow camp dwellers.  But Syrians are starting to make lists of those still working inside Syria.

• In communities across Syria, activists are circulating lists of local government informers....
• Activists insist that the purpose of publishing the lists...is to pressure and isolate those who inform on their neighbours rather than to initiate vigilante justice....
• The regime in Syria has always relied on a network of paid informants – often known as fasfous – to keep the population under control....
• According to one protester from the central Damascus neighbourhood of Midan, being associated with the secret police, or mukhabarat, offered protection, status and a source of income before the protests began. ("Syrian activists name regime informers,", by Abigail Fielding-Smith in Beirut, Financial Times July 28, 2011)

Of course, the terms themselves are of shifting meaning and import (neither official police, nor secret). At least they tend to dress the part, as if in a "B" movie.

• Mind you that English phrase—”secret police”—is doubly misleading when applied to Syria’s cops.... [T]he “Mukhabarat,” [is] a catch-all term uttered only in hushed tones, which encompasses a multitude of agencies with responsibilities like “political security” or “internal security.” In Bashar Assad’s Syria, the Mukhabarat are nothing less than a professional bureaucracy specializing in the production and dissemination of fear....
• The Mukhabarat’s agents are everywhere, inescapable in their unofficial uniform of black leather jackets and dress pants.  That they are easily recognizable points to the second misleading aspect of describing them as “secret police”: Much of the power of the Mukhabarat lies not in its secrecy, but in its visibility. Its personnel mingle with pedestrians on crowded streets, sit in cafes, or just stand on street corners, watching. ("Life Among Syria’s Not-So-Secret Police," by Jonathan Panter, Jasine Report, 14 July 2011)

Combined Action on Several Fronts in Western Libya


Great map from @k_thos, courtesy of Libya 17 February ("Map: Libya last updated August 14," 15 August 2011), which also notes that Libya’s interior minister, Nassr al-Mabrouk Abdullah and family arrived in Cairo signally a possible defection, and includes the second of Al Jazeera’s Zeina Khodr's amazing reports from Zawiyah  ("Video: Revolutionaries say they control 70% of Zawiyah," 15 August 2011.  For the latter, note the bridge which FF control (or at least are huddled under).  That is one of the last two supply lines to Tripoli.  Perhaps Mr. al-Mabrouk Abdullah knows something.

Certainly, a comment in Al Jazeera's Live Blog a couple days ago, is another tea leave about the endgame.

• Speaking from a prisoner of war camp in the rebel enclave of Misrata, Colonel Wissam Miland said Gaddafi's military hangs together through coercion and mercenary-enforced martial law, but that infighting is rife.
• "I think it will soon collapse," he said, offering a rare glimpse inside Gaddafi's three-pronged loyalist force, made of up army regulars, militia fighters and mercenaries....
• "Within my unit there were a lot of mercenaries," Miland said. "But they are not fighting with the army -- they surround the army. They don't let anyone fall back. If you retreat, they will kill you." ("Saturday, August 13, 2011 - 15:20 - Libya," Al Jazeera Live Blog)

Turns out that the FF Opposition is not the only group with splits and divisions.

The Whole World Is/Will Be/Should Be/Can Be Watching

Interesting story on Local Coordination Committees in Syria on Morning Edition, NPR.  Links to left include now Local Coordination Committees of Syria, and the LCC are now one of the main conduits of news out of that country.

Our (noncombatant) Ears and Eyes On the Ground

Terry Gross's Fresh Air Interview with C.J. Chivers is much recommended. As is his website and his Twitter page (on our list to the left).

The Sedition Incident Would Be A Good Name For A Band

Iran's Revolutionary Guard commander, Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafar, appears to use the official term for the Green Revolution:

Greenery or Shrubbery: You Decide

• "Members of the reformist camp who have not crossed the red lines can naturally participate in political campaigns," he said. "However, Mr. Khatami's success in his activities depends on his stances. Mr. Khatami [former President Mohammad Khatami, elected to office twice with more than 70% of the popular vote] did not pass his test successfully during the sedition incident and he showed a lot of support for the sedition leaders." ("IRAN: Commander outlines Revolutionary Guard's muscular role in politics and economy," Babylon & Beyond, Los Angeles Times, July 5, 2011)

Good Soldier Švejk in Damascus

As noted previously the character Bretschneider, undercover agent for the state police, in the novel Švejk, was perhaps the model for various mukhabarat in all authoritarian regimes.  The model is based a multi-national empire such as the Austro-Hungarian.  Does this apply to Syria?  Certainly the religious and ethnic regions on the borderlands are most volatile, and there are those among them who strongly dislike the ruling Alawites.  The protests have not been strong in Damascus.  But the secret police also dominate the (lack of) discussion in the capital.

Bretschneider watching for suspect views in the tavern.

• The resilience of the protest movement is not immediately apparent in Damascus. On Fridays, hundreds of plainclothes mukhabarat, or secret police, mill around public places. There are military checkpoints on the roads out of the city, and usually bustling markets and bus stations are empty. Suburbs such as Muadhimiya and Douma, where thousands have rallied in recent weeks, are now inaccessible, locked down by the army, with movements by residents severely restricted. ("Syria: In Damascus, uprising against regime brings fundamental changes," (Babylon & Beyond, LA Times, June 7, 2011)

UPDATE (role of informants, this time from Tripoli): "'The single most powerful tool the regime has is informants. That’s the tool we fear the most,' said an activist who uses the name Niz, one of the few in Tripoli who manages to maintain contact with the outside world on a secure Internet service." ("Tripoli activists plot revolt without Facebook," June 26, 2011, Reuters, re-posted Libya 17 February 2011)

End Game?

Battle in Misrata (see map) and siege in Mountains (Zintan, above) continues.  But the drip-drip of defections might signify another front:

• Eight generals from embattled Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's army have defected to Italy, the Italian Foreign Ministry told CNN Monday.
• The generals were accompanied by more than 100 Libyan soldiers, a senior Italian official with first-hand knowledge of and responsibility for the operation said.
• The Libyans crossed their country's border into Tunisia, where they were met by Italian intelligence agents, the official said. ("Libyan generals, soldiers defect; South African leader meets Gadhafi," by the CNN Wire Staff, May 30, 2011; see also "Over 100 Libyan army members defect from Gaddafi," by Deepa Babington, Reuters, May 30, 2011)

Gaming the System in Tehran

Presidents Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Even dictators, especially dictators,  need to remain popular (that is, they need a constituency). President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appears to have added his iffy performance in the last election, plus (+) the many protests since then, plus (+) street protests across the nearby Arab world (especially Syria?), plus (+) stalled economy, to equal (=) a need to change the system. This might not buy him new support (although Pres. Ahmadinejad is not an unintelligent political operative), but it certainly will bring him into conflict with the inheritors/watchdogs of the 1979 Revolution.

• Ahmadinejad also confronted the conservative majority in parliament by rejecting its demand for a new committee to oversee the parliamentary elections due this winter...
• This escalating confrontation between the president and the leader on the one hand, and the president and the parliament on the other is causing new cracks at the leadership level, effectively creating a three-tier system....
• The controversial Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who is Ahmadinejad's chief of staff, his main adviser and confidant, leads the president's team. They are the most rightwing conservatives; yet, because they are nonclerical and younger looking they seem bold in challenging the clergy. Mashaei is demanding an "Iranian republic" rather than an "Islamic Republic" – apparently in an effort to attract the young who protested after the presidential elections of 2009. ("Ahmadinejad has fuelled Iran's power struggle," by Massoumeh Torfeh, guardian.co.uk, Saturday 21 May 2011)

Taking on both the leader and Parliament might be a bridge too far. Ali Larijani, who was just reelected as Speaker of the Majles (Parliament) for another year, appears to have had coups in mind when he commented on Iranian history a half-century back:

• In a speech he delivered at a conference on the history of the Majles, Larijani said that the parliament is not supposed to be controlled by the executive branch. Referring to the late Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, Larijani said, "Mosaddegh's strategic mistake was that he dissolved the Majles. That laid the foundation for the [CIA-sponsored] coup [of 1953], and concentrated the power in the executive branch, which led to the Majles becoming powerless. Any country that commits such an error will either have a revolution or a coup. If the countries of the region had powerful legislative branches, they would not have experienced popular revolutions. Moreover, if the legal framework [to express] the popular demand is respected, there would never be a dictatorship. It is not an honor for the executive branch to declare that to develop the country it must control the Majles; this is the foundation for a dictatorship. But it is an honor when the legislative branch controls the executive branch."("Is Mashaei Next?," Frontline Press Roundup, May 26, 20110)

Beyond Tahrir Square?: the Dark End of the Street in Manama, Damascus, and Tripoli

A chilling report on Bahrain. ("Bahrain, Kingdom of Silence," by Toby C. Jones, Arab Reform Bulletin, May 4, 2011).  The comments are also evocative.

And there is a similar return to fear of informers in Tripoli. ("Fear of crackdown, conscription haunts Libyan capital," by Lin Noueihed, Reuters, May 7, 2011)

And of course, this has long been the case in Damascus.  I found the cartoon below at Syrian Uprising 2011 Information Centre.  Press cc: for subtitles in English. (Basically all the rabbits complain until in front of their leader, at which point they sing his praises, except for Brave Rabbit, who asks for more rabbit food.  This proves an unwise tactic.  Until....)

Outsiders View Asad's Syria Inside

Joshua Landis provides a link to this video made by two Hungarian journalists, Gergő Plankó & Bence Gáspár Tamás, who shot great footage inside Damascus. (“Nobody Is Free In The World” – Report From Damascus by Gergő Plankó & Bence Gáspár Tamás, May 4th, 2011, English subtitles) It begins with a regional overview of protests, or, rather, crackdowns, then moves to original footage.

The Two Michaels: Orientalist Prophets of Doom

Two of the high-priests of intelligence privatization and managers of the Chertoff group, "a security and risk-management firm," Michael Chertoff (former secretary of homeland security) and Michael V. Hayden (former director of the CIA from 2006 to 2009 and director of the National Security Agency from 1999 to 2005) trot out the old tribalist (e.g., those people are different) argument:

• Optimists can point to the fact that Libya is more ethnically and religiously homogeneous than, say, Iraq, but it is also more tribal than most Arab societies. As brutal as he has been, Gaddafi has still had to respect tribal dynamics to sustain his rule. Is the United States confident that the dominant narrative today, of democrats vs. oppressor, will continue to play out — and will not be overtaken by latent ones such as tribe vs. tribe, haves vs. have-nots or, worse, Islam vs. “crusaders”? ("What happens after Gaddafi is removed?," by Michael Chertoff and Michael V. Hayden, Washington Post, April 21, 2011)

They are correct to the extent that, yes, anything might happen.  But Hayden also used "the devil you know" argument on-screen as an "expert" on CNN last week.  And you can see the inklings of "the devil you know" qualifier gambit "As brutal as he has been...." In Libya, yes, there are tribes.In the Arab world, yes, there is Islam. But this sure has the hallmarks of a nationalist rebellion at the moment. Not that I know much about Libya; my knowledge of it is about the same as Hayden's.