How do we interpret "revolutionary situations" and "revolutionary outcomes" (to use the Charles Tilly's language, "Conflict, Revolt and Revolution," European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford, 1993), ch. 1) of recent and current rebellions? Avishai Margalit, in a piece analyzing current pundits on the Arab Spring, notes that we often do so by choosing the wrong historical revolution. Margalit asks, "Why were the Arab revolutions, especially in Egypt, such a shocking surprise to almost all who care?" His answer is often because we have only one, or only one main, historical example of a "revolution":
- "We are in the grip of an idea about revolutions. The idea is the Bolshevik model (or the Jacobin one, if we go back in time), according to which a revolution worth its salt is the outcome of a centralized organization that acts under a unified command.... This idea is dubious when applied to Russia in 1917, let alone to other revolutions. It holds true for Russia’s October Revolution, but it does not hold true for Russia’s February Revolution. The latter, like those in Egypt and Tunisia this year, lacked a central organization. ("From Ground Zero to Tahrir Square," by Avishai Margalit, Democracy, Issue #21, Summer 2011)
Others continue to focus on the "social revolution" model. Lawrence Wright notes of "the martyrs of the Arab Spring so far: Some 200...in Tunisia...[;] in Egypt...840...[;] More than a thousand...in Yemen....[;] in Syria, more than 2,200..."
- "The protesters are not just bringing about badly needed social revolutions in their societies. By their moral example, they are redefining Islam and redeeming it from the savage caricature that bin Laden made of his religion" (“Two Questions at the Heart of Bin Laden’s Jihad," by Lawrence Wright, Bloomberg”, Sept. 8, 2011)
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