Springs Eternal?

Barakat (Enough) anti-vote Algerians

"Eight Hopeful Legacies of the Arab Spring," by John Cassidy, The New Yorker, 14 April 2014. Meanwhile, signs of another Spring in Algeria?

Revolution as Model or Metaphor?

In May, Der Spiegel interviewed Emmanuel Todd, who "sees himself as an 'empirical Hegelian' who recognizes a universal course of history," about the emergent Arab Spring. Both Der Spiegel and Todd ransacked European history for the appropriate comparative model. For Der Spiegel it was "a breathtaking acceleration of history, similar to the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989." For Todd it was the cycle of phases, or, more darkly, that a revolution eats its young:

• "Revolutions often end up as something different from what their supporters proclaim at the beginning.... It took almost a century from the time of the French Revolution in 1789 until the democratic form of government, in the form of the Third Republic, finally took shape after France had lost a war against the Germans in 1871. In the interim, there was Napoleon, the royalist restoration and the Second Empire under Napoleon III, the 'little one,' as Victor Hugo said derisively." (05/20/2011, "Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate: A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution," Der Spiegel)

That last comment is a conscious echo of Marx's observation that history repeats itself, "the first as tragedy, then as farce" (The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, 1852).  If France, 1789-1871, seems a bit broad, in the third part of the interview Todd expands to all of Europe in 1848.

• The Arab Spring resembles the European Spring of 1848 more closely than the fall of 1989, when communism collapsed. The initial spark in France triggered unrest in Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Austria, Italy, Spain and Romania -- a classic chain reaction, despite major regional differences. 

More recently, the Syrian Protests, which most viewed at best as a "revolutionary situation," has now become viewed as entering a second radical phase.  At least that is the claim of "The Age of the Guillotine!" (Syrian Revolution Digest, September 18, 2011): "Ideologies will soon flourish, and compromises will be harder to reach, even between the revolutionaries, pragmatism is now more necessary and harder to attain."  2011 as 1793?

Comparative Revolutions: Part Deux

How do we interpret "revolutionary situations" and "revolutionary outcomes" (to use the Charles Tilly's language, "Conflict, Revolt and Revolution,"  European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford, 1993), ch. 1) of recent and current rebellions? Avishai Margalit, in a piece analyzing current pundits on the Arab Spring, notes that we often do so by choosing the wrong historical revolution.  Margalit asks, "Why were the Arab revolutions, especially in Egypt, such a shocking surprise to almost all who care?"  His answer is often because we have only one, or only one main, historical example of a "revolution":

• "We are in the grip of an idea about revolutions. The idea is the Bolshevik model (or the Jacobin one, if we go back in time), according to which a revolution worth its salt is the outcome of a centralized organization that acts under a unified command.... This idea is dubious when applied to Russia in 1917, let alone to other revolutions. It holds true for Russia’s October Revolution, but it does not hold true for Russia’s February Revolution. The latter, like those in Egypt and Tunisia this year, lacked a central organization. ("From Ground Zero to Tahrir Square," by Avishai Margalit, Democracy, Issue #21, Summer 2011)

Not only is his point worth considering, surely choosing any of the "sloppy" early modern revolutions before 1789 would also allow use to make more informed comparisons about those not lead by a centralized cadre (and castigating Libya, or Syria, or Egypt for not having the thing that we pretended they needed to have in the first place).

Others continue to focus on the "social revolution" model.  Lawrence Wright notes of "the martyrs of the Arab Spring so far: Some 200...in Tunisia...[;] in Egypt...840...[;] More than a thousand...in Yemen....[;] in Syria, more than 2,200..."

• "The protesters are not just bringing about badly needed social revolutions in their societies. By their moral example, they are redefining Islam and redeeming it from the savage caricature that bin Laden made of his religion" (“Two Questions at the Heart of Bin Laden’s Jihad," by Lawrence Wright, Bloomberg”, Sept. 8, 2011)

Not just, but also.  Time to dust-off the social revolution model or at least make a working definition.

Social Media Revolution or Old-Fashioned Social Revolution?

The events of the Arab Spring (and the wider events of the Summer of 2011) draw analysts to the comparative.  Thus, the editors of the Middle East Report note "the Syrian revolt of 2011...is the nightmarish opposite of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionary dream." ("Syria's Torment," the Editors, Middle East Report, August 10, 2011, Middle East Research and Information Project) One of these is not like the other. Such comparisons are the bread-and-butter of all those who search for the independent variable, be they historical sociologists or political scientists.  But the comparative is a game that historians must play if they are going to use terms to describe what is going on.  (Is it a revolt, sire?...)  And, indeed, the analysts tend to draw from the ready-made language of historical, even European revolts, to understand the present.  Thus, the same Middle East Report: "No rustic jacquerie, the Syrian revolt has leaped from town to town." ("Syria's Torment,") (Are, then, protest videos posted to Youtube the new urban cahiers de doléances?)

It might seem that recent media-drenched revolts are tailor-made for the linguistic turn - deep cultural analysis of modes of discourse.  And certainly there were claims at the outset that the Medium is the Message:

• "Yet another Facebook revolution: why are we so surprised?," by John Naughton, The Observer, 23 January 2011
• "Faces of the Facebook Revolution," by Lenora Jane Estes, Vanity Fair, 4 April 2011
• "Why not call it a Facebook revolution?," by Chris Taylor, February 24, 2011, CNN
  

Just a partial listing, shows how this quickly devolved to a meer trope.  Naughton revealed the formula:

• "The story is always the same: something unexpected happens in the real world; journalists notice that some of the people involved are users of the web/mobiles/Facebook/Twitter (delete as appropriate); the unexpected is then labelled 'the Facebook/Twitter/smartphone (delete as etc) revolution/protest/demonstration/election'." ("Yet another Facebook revolution")

Instead, what has dominated analysis is state-centered analysis of social revolutions, the type that developed out of the 1960s and 1970s from Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, and Charles Tilly. For Skocpol, state situations, not revolutionary ideologies, are most determinative of successful revolutions which she distinguishes as fundamentally different from unsuccessful ones.

•  “Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below." Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (1979), 4

And Jeff Goodwin reiterates this definition in his "narrow" revolution definition below:

• "Two definitions of a revolution: a broad one, where revolution is 'any and all instances in which a state or a political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extraconstitutional and/or violent fashion'; and a narrow one, in which 'revolutions entail not only mass mobilization and regime change, but also more or less rapid and fundamental social, economic and/or cultural change, during or soon after the struggle for state power.'” Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 9, cited in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution.

What is intriguing is that the language of the state-centered analysis of social revolutions has returned to center stage. Anne-Marie Slaughter has recently drawn a number of "lessons" from recent events in Libya in the Financial Times. "The first is that, against the sceptics, it clearly can be in the US and the west’s strategic interest to help social revolutions fighting for the values we espouse and proclaim. The strategic interest in helping the Libyan opposition came from supporting democracy and human rights, but also being seen to live up to those values by the 60 per cent majority of Middle Eastern populations who are under 30 and increasingly determined to hold their governments to account. This value-based argument was inextricable from the interest-based argument." (Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Why Libya sceptics were proved badly wrong," Financial Times, August 24, 2011)  And there are many analyses of contemporary Arab "social revolutions": see for example "Social revolution in Tunisia and Egypt" (Steven Adolf and Sadik Harchaoui, Forum Report, 11 February 2011).  Is this another trope or a useful recognition of what is going on on the ground?  Perhaps it is best to note that the link between the state political and the social is a useful metaphor, then and now.

Surely Juan Cole Deserves Some Credit Too

Tripoli, 22 August (see Immoral Minority, etc.)

Great article by Juan Cole ("Top Ten Myths about the Libya War," 08/22/2011, Informed Comment) who surely gets to take a bow for not only supporting Libyan FF, but supporting the limited air support by the US/UK/France/Nato since before its inception.  From my, admittedly circumscribed view, I would only question 2 of his myths:

1. " The United States led the charge to war. There is no evidence for this allegation whatsoever."  Doesn't this go against the Lizza, New Yorker article which stated, some months ago: "Nonetheless, Obama may be moving toward something resembling a doctrine. One of his advisers described the President’s actions in Libya as 'leading from behind'"? ("The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy," by Ryan Lizza, New Yorker, May 2, 2011)  Lizza's article (and the adviser) might be wrong, but I don't recall Mr. Cole taking them to task earlier.
2. "The Libyan Revolution was a civil war. It was not, if by that is meant a fight between two big groups within the body politic."  This is more a judgement call.  Charles Tilly's definition of a revolution is when two groups of elites appeal to non-elites and the two blocks fight to control state apparatus.  In a revolutionary situation,civil wars often are a stage.  That appears to have happened over the past few months.  I think Cole rightly wants to show that Qaddafi's support among non-elites was not that strong.  I agree.  But, for as long as it lasts, I think we can term this a civil war, because Qaddafi did have some, if limited, support

Those are my caveats to an otherwise outstanding string of great articles on Libya.  Which is why Informed Comment is on My Blog List to the left of this blog.

Regime Change = Curriculum Change?

We used to have to revise notes on yellow legal pads.  Now we have to alter our Powerpoints. "The 'Arab Moment' began January 2011.  Discuss."

• What just happened in Tunisia is going to change the canon that Columbia students read for Contemporary Civilization. As either current or former Columbia students, we all know what the French Revolution of 1789 represented for Europe. We will soon see what the Tunisian revolution of 2011 is going to be for the Arab world. ("A new beginning for Tunisia: Tunisia's revolution is a call for increased student awareness," by Youssef Cherif, February 8, 2011, Columbia Spectator)
  

To compare or not to compare:  Is Revolution an Egyptian Word?

The blog Abu Muqawama ("Egypt: A Humble Request," January 30, 2011) makes a timely point: "can we all agree to stop using European historical analogies to describe what is taking place in Egypt? It's not Europe in 1848 or Eastern Europe in 1989 or France in 1789: it's Egypt in 2011.... When we use "western" frames of reference to make sense of what is taking place, by contrast, we a) sound really freaking narcissistic and b) fail to take those local phenomena seriously and thus miss a lot of what is going on."

I think the problem is not a Western frame of reference. After all, students of revolutions have developed some interesting insights into revolutions around the World by comparing them to earlier revolutions for which there is a fair amount of detail (France, Russia, China, etc.). 

The problem is the use of an analysis of a past revolution, to explain the future development of a rebellion that has not developed into a revolution as yet.  It turns out that no revolution springs full-blown from the head of Zeus, or from those involved in the early days (American mythology of founding fathers not withstanding).  Entrenched groups resist, movements radicalize, and the end result is much different than what people foresaw going in. (see The Dangers of Reification)

So, yes, that said, it IS important to remind commentators that (1) understanding 20th-century Egyptian history is more important than understanding 19th-century European history in understanding the current situation in Egypt (in this sense, 1952, 1956, 1981 in Egypt are more important than 1848, 1968, etc., elsewhere); and (2) to compare in revolutions is to deploy a metaphor (and as John Gaddis, Landscape of History suggests, that is what scientists, from geologists to astrophysicists, do).

Wild in the Streets (1968, 2011)




Is youth rebellion always good or always bad?

• Some political scientists warn of the dark side of the "youth bulge." A study by Population Action International asserted that 80 percent of the world's conflicts between 1970 and 1999 started in countries where 60 percent of the population was under 30. ("The Arab World's Youth Army," by Ellen Knickmeyer, Foreign Policy, January 27, 2011)

Some indications of hope from the young protestors:

• Now Al Jazeera is reporting that young protesters have formed a human chain around the museum to protect it against looting. It seems for now that this treasure trove of human ingenuity and the natural world's wonders is in no immediate danger. ("Egypt (and Beyond) LiveBlog: Black Hole or Another Day of Revolution," January 28, 2011, Scott Lucas, EAWorldView) 

But the riot police are generally young as well (as here from Liberation Square, Cairo).  The median age in Tunisia is 30; the median age in Cairo is 24; the median age in Yemen is less than 18.  More than 2/3 the population of Yemen is under 24.  (source: 29 January 2011, "What next in Yemen?," by Ginny Hill, BBC)

The Dangers of Reification (Verdinglichung) of Riot and Rebellion


Green Revolution, Jasmine Revolution, Twitter Revolution, Pink Revolution 1, and Pink Revolution 2:  some are, some aren't.  The revolution happens after the riots.  And it is difficult for journalists to know.  The danger is not just in our pronouncements.  It is also on the streets.