Farouk or Nasser?

Richard Cavendish remembers Abdul Fattah al-Sisi's King Farouk's succession to the Egyptian throne on April 28th, 1936 (History Today 61, April 2011). Or were the army officers on the other side, at least by 1952? ("Egypt wonders if army chief General Sisi is another Nasser," Martin Chulov, Guardian News Service, Cairo, August 09, 2013)

Varieties of Revolution

"What is the Egyptian anti-coup movement protesting for?," by Neil Ketchley and Michael Biggs, Washington Post (April 4, 2014) analyzes polling data from protestors. Meanwhile, the protests, the mass trials (and incarcerations) continue.

Mapping the Middle East

While the surveys included in the set “40 Maps That Explain the World” (Max Fisher, August 12 2013, Washington Post) have not been delivered to many of the countries in the Middle East, the comparative information is useful for future research design. For example, has Egypt's belief in democracy over a strong leader changed in the last month?

More local mapping can be found of the protests and backlash in Egypt in August ("Mapping Egypt’s Week of Chaos," Joshua Keating, Slate, Aug. 20, 2013) Using some of the same technology as "Mapped: Every Protest on the Planet Since 1979," J. DANA STUSTER, Foreign Policy, AUGUST 22, 2013, the dark circles of Cairo are noteworthy, but it is probably those outliers where these will continue longest.

Read Any Good Revolutions Lately?

[In the run-up to the run-off, I had been reviewing the past year's events in print and online. But, as I wrote the following, the Egyptian judges overturned the parliamentary elections (well some of them). What follows is not my comment on the current situation (counter-revolution?, coup?, just the messiness of transitioning from revolution to democracy?).  That will come later, if it is not beyond my abilities.]

As protests begin to achieve a critical mass again (albeit much lower than last year) in Tahrir ("Tahrir Protests Continue," June 6, 2012, by Hossam El-Hamalawy, Jadaliyya), I have returned to a few books written after the first flush of enthusiasm about the Egyptian Spring (there is a movie Tahrir - Liberation Square, which looks interesting, but I have only seen the trailers). Three books focusing on events of 2011.  For an outsider, not simply trying to understand what happened/is happening in Egypt, but how to understand the modern world, I found Ashraf Khalil, Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation (St. Martin’s Press, 2012) to be most revelatory. Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0 (2012) is mainly the story of the politicization of one person (albeit a very interesting and thought-provoking story).  Marwan Bishara, The Invisible Arab (2012) wants to jump straight to the commentary without enough grounding in the narrative (Bishara might have the grounding, but he doesn't provide the reader with it). Khalil, as a Cairo-based reporter for European news services, is both in the revolution and reporting on it. Intriguing chapters on Tahrir days reveal how the street protests actually created community (communities) more once the government shut down phone/internet communication, forcing everyone to speak to everyone else to find out what was going on on the next block. More than Ghonim and Bishara, Khalil roots the revolution in the past decade of Egyptian history.  As such, it appeals most to the mere historian in me.  See also, now a new collection of essays on this context ("The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest, and Social Change in Egypt," reviewed by Arang Keshavarzian, in mobilizingideas, June 13, 2012), which I suppose is my next port of call to read.

Finally, a very detailed reconstruction of the life and death of Khaled Saeed has been written by Amro Ali in Jadaliyya ("Saeeds of Revolution: De-Mythologizing Khaled Saeed," June 5, 2012 by Amro Ali, Jadaliyya)

Neither Feloul nor Islamist

Revolutions create their own sense of time and periodization. An article exploring why Hamdeen Sabbahi gained such support with a minimal machine behind him ("Why Did Sabbahi - 'One of Us' - Do So Well?," Jadaliyya [and Ahram Online], May 26 2012, by Ekram Ibrahim), notes that one of his chief attributes was that he was "neither feloul [remnant]...nor Islamist. Another is titled, "In the field of feloul, Shafiq rules" (by Rana Khazbak and Heba Afify, Egypt Independent, 26/05/2012). Another blog groups the votes of Shafiq and Moussa together to map the Feloul votes (which might surprise those leftists who were strategically voting with the latter only to see his candidacy slide into fourth ("Mapping the Egyptian Presidential Election," May 26, 2012, by Eric Schewe). But returning to Sabbahi; he is neither feloul nor Islamist because he is neither the candidate of a return to the Mubarak era (Ahmed Shafiq, currently in 2nd place) nor the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate (Mohamed Mursi, currently in 1st, although official results are not released). But Sabbahi is a self-described Nasserist, obviously a position of an old, very old regime, if not the old regime. In an election in which the 57-year-old Sabbahi can lay claim to the youth vote because he is the youngest candidate, everyone will be tied to the way pre-revolutionary politics were played in one way or another. The key is what politics they stand for going forward.

When French Revolutionaries created the Ancien Régime, post facto as that what they had been rebelling against, they created opponents of the Revolution which they called the Ci-devants (the "so-called").  The ci-devants were so-called because they were former aristocrats, whose privileges and social status were abolished by the Revolution (and the night of 4 August 1789). So there were no more nobles, but the remnant remained, at least in terms of those supporting the policies similar to or even the restoration of the Old Regime.

Which brings us to the Ancien Régime, the Old Order: "isqat al-nizam," was the cry to bring down the old "regime" in Egypt. But it was, by the vagaries of language, also the call to bring down "order." It is not surprising that many voters would seek to avoid demolishing order. The feloul voters, the ci-devants, are not simply those who benefited by the Old Order, but those who fear the absence of nizam.

Egypt: Vox Pop, Vox Populi

(based on al-Ahram polls; see "Reading
the tea-leaves" for the latest)

Yesterday, I posted a shout-out to Egypt on elections (that is, they often look uninspiring until one looks at the alternatives), and hoped they would soon have their own Nate Silver. Well, I found one. Issandr El Amrani today posts a useful analysis of the Egyptian Presidential Candidates and their prospects (based, of course on pre-election polling and positioning). ("My belated take on Egypt's elections," by Issandr El Amrani, The Arabist, May 24, 2012) If Aboul Fotouh or Sabahi would fit the view of those seeking change, that seems unlikely to be the desire of more than a third of the population.

Many posts, at least in English, are similar to vox pop journalism now running on Al Jazeera, etc. (see, for example, "Egypt Votes, At Last," by Wendell Steavenson, New Yorker, May 23, 2012). My own take from one such clip were women in line who stated (through the translation) that whoever won should take care, else they would vote him out next time. The revolution is not synonymous withe the elections. Day 2 of Egypt's first post-Mubarak presidential elections continues today.

Egypt: Vox Dei, Vox Populi?

Greetings, Egyptians. Welcome to the problems and opportunities of mass democracy. The process sometimes produces the debacle of hanging chads and the hung election between Al Gore and George W. Bush; and it sometimes produces the government of Il Popolo della Libertà party led by Silvio Berlusconi. But its value and veracity is never just in one election. May you long have the joy of psephology and may you soon have your own Nate Silver.

Friending Revolution

Reading two books which grew out of Arab Spring:

• Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People Is Greater Than the People in Power: A Memoir (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012) and 
• Marwan Bishara, The Invisible Arab: The Promise and Peril of the Arab Revolutions (Nation Books, 2012).

(Amazon has a nice, simple interview with Mr. Ghonim.) Both works appear to be by writers who don't read books a lot. (This might apply more to Ghonim than to Bishara, but the notes from the latter cite mainly websites.) This is an observation, not a criticism. Ghonim's work is as much about social media and the synergy between education in marketing and computing and political science as it is about the Egyptian Revolution. Still, the first-person story makes the swirl of events (see this blog over the past year-plus) accessible; and provides key insights to generational shifts. And hope.

From Both Sides Now

Two interesting perspectives on Arab Spring (not exactly an accurate term, but the best we have at the moment).

1) "A closer look at the unrest sweeping the Arab world" (Hürriyet Daily News, April 20 2011)  Summaries of the situation in each nation from Morocco to Syria from a Turkish point of view.  My favorite is the summary of relations with Iran: "Relations established: 1639, when the two countries signed a border agreement. First ambassador sent to Iran in 1835."  True: as long as you consider Turkey to be synonymous with the Ottoman Empire and modern Iran to be synonymous with the Safavid Empire!

2) "Revolution U: What Egypt Learned from the Students who Overthrew Milosevic" (Tina Rosenberg, Foreign Policy, February 16, 2011)

"Mubarak! Ben Ali! It's now the turn of Seyed Ali!"

Coverage of Iran in the context of the Arab World revolts to its West  (the newest deal, 19 February 2011, "After Tunisia, Egypt, and 25 Bahman, a Clear Shift in Iran's Political Landscape") and in the Arab world itself ("The awakening: As change sweeps through the Middle East, the world has many reasons to fear. But it also has one great hope," The Economist, Feb 17th 2011).  [Note Green bracelet of the Iranian movement on a de facto leader of the Egyptian movement.]

Military Officers + The People = Co-Rule?

12:05 CST.  MSNBC discussing whether it is a military coup.  Richard Engel notes it is "a bloodless military coup."

12:00 CST.  Aljazeera has an article on "Egypt's military leadership," which profiles the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (11 Feb 2011)

Defence Minister Mohammed Hussein Tantawi
11:50 CST.  Anderson Cooper asking Mohamed ElBaradei about how you keep the revolution from being "betrayed" (odd word, evidently coming from a CIA adviser), Mr. ElBaradei answers "the Army must co-rule with the people (my paraphrase).  Uppermost on everyone's mind.

Roll me over, Romeo

Mr. Moussavi and Mr. Karroubi have made a request to support the Egyptian protests. "With just under a week to go before the proposed demonstration, the call has provoked a large online response centering around the 25 Bahman Facebook page, a reference to the rally’s date in the Persian calendar"  ("Iran’s Opposition Seeks Rally to Back Egypt and Tunisia," by William Yong, New York Times, February 7, 2011)  It should be noted that the Iranian government changed more than Egypt's in the last few decades, I suppose.

Does Hope Spring From the Barrel of a Tank?:  the Problem with Relying on Military Officers to Foster Change

Thoughtful detail from Londonistani on the roots of the Egyptian protests.  Americans have to ask how much and for how long they are willing to fund those officers.

• Mubarak...was the fourth leader of the Egypt's Free Officers' regime which came to power in a military coup against a constitutional monarchy in 1952. Egypt has a long history of being at the forefront of Middle East affairs and its people have a strong sense of pride. Political squabbling, corrupt politicians and disastrous war against the newly formed state of Israel motivated the middle class military professionals to remove their king, and British influence along with him. The coup's leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser, made Egypt the focal point of Arab hopes and earned their eternal admiration. In reality, he achieved little. His successor, Anwar el-Sadat switched the regime from the pro-Soviet to the pro-Western camp during the cold war. Sadat realised post-independence Egypt's central problem; it's economic muscle didn't match its ambition....
• Egypt's military leaders['s]...phobia of political competition acquired by their experience of the constitutional monarchy they replaced prodded them to the conclusion that Egyptians were not ready for democracy....
• [T]he problem with a rule-by-military-clique approach to government is that it does little for long-term development. Sadat's solution to this problem was to leverage Egypt's strategic value to the United States as a source of income. ("Mubarak and Me," January 31, 2011, Londonstani, Abu Muqawama)

Comparing Egypt with Egypt: J-Curve and Revolutions of Rising Expectations

Perhaps Hosni Mubarak's political party will recognize the situation they are in.  It is reminiscent of the one that brought them to power. James C. Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review 27, no. 1 (February 1, 1962): 5-19, developed the J-Curve theory of revolution.  One figure is the J-Curve of rising expectations in Egypt ca. 1950, which don't continue, leading to Nasser's Revolution.  Not often does a 50-year old, political science theory have legs.  Fareed Zakaria seems to have been channeling Davies on his CNN GPS show, 30 January:

• You see, Tunisia and Egypt had been reforming their economies. This stimulated growth as a consequence. Tunisia have been growing at 5 percent a year and Egypt much faster than that. Economic growth stirs up expectations. It is this revolution of rising expectations that often undoes a dictatorship, because it is unable to handle the growing demands of its citizens. (FAREED ZAKARIA GPS, "Unrest in Egypt," Aired January 30, 2011 - 10:00 ET)

To compare or not to compare:  Is Revolution an Egyptian Word?

The blog Abu Muqawama ("Egypt: A Humble Request," January 30, 2011) makes a timely point: "can we all agree to stop using European historical analogies to describe what is taking place in Egypt? It's not Europe in 1848 or Eastern Europe in 1989 or France in 1789: it's Egypt in 2011.... When we use "western" frames of reference to make sense of what is taking place, by contrast, we a) sound really freaking narcissistic and b) fail to take those local phenomena seriously and thus miss a lot of what is going on."

I think the problem is not a Western frame of reference. After all, students of revolutions have developed some interesting insights into revolutions around the World by comparing them to earlier revolutions for which there is a fair amount of detail (France, Russia, China, etc.). 

The problem is the use of an analysis of a past revolution, to explain the future development of a rebellion that has not developed into a revolution as yet.  It turns out that no revolution springs full-blown from the head of Zeus, or from those involved in the early days (American mythology of founding fathers not withstanding).  Entrenched groups resist, movements radicalize, and the end result is much different than what people foresaw going in. (see The Dangers of Reification)

So, yes, that said, it IS important to remind commentators that (1) understanding 20th-century Egyptian history is more important than understanding 19th-century European history in understanding the current situation in Egypt (in this sense, 1952, 1956, 1981 in Egypt are more important than 1848, 1968, etc., elsewhere); and (2) to compare in revolutions is to deploy a metaphor (and as John Gaddis, Landscape of History suggests, that is what scientists, from geologists to astrophysicists, do).

Why Egyptian Street Protests?: a University Professor Lays Out the Bullet Points

• First of all, they want a real democracy.
• Another issue is the use of torture by the police, who are protected by the Emergency Law.
• The third is corruption.
• Connected to the corruption is the bureaucratic inefficiency.
• The last problem is the poverty.

("A Short Primer on Egypt Now," by guest post by Noor Khan, American Footprints, January 29th, 2011)  Professor Ulrich recommends We are all Khaled Said which includes latest video links.

Liberation 1944, 2011

• The Egyptian tanks, the delirious protesters sitting atop them, the flags, the 40,000 protesters weeping and crying and cheering in Freedom Square and praying around them, the Muslim Brotherhood official sitting amid the tank passengers. Should this be compared to the liberation of Bucharest? Climbing on to an American-made battle tank myself, I could only remember those wonderful films of the liberation of Paris. A few hundred metres away, Hosni Mubarak's black-uniformed security police were still firing at demonstrators near the interior ministry. It was a wild, historical victory celebration, Mubarak's own tanks freeing his capital from his own dictatorship.
• In the pantomime world of Mubarak himself – and of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in Washington – the man who still claims to be president of Egypt swore in the most preposterous choice of vice-president in an attempt to soften the fury of the protesters – Omar Suleiman, Egypt's chief negotiator with Israel and his senior intelligence officer, a 75-year-old with years of visits to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and four heart attacks to his credit. How this elderly apparatchik might be expected to deal with the anger and joy of liberation of 80 million Egyptians is beyond imagination. When I told the demonstrators on the tank around me the news of Suleiman's appointment, they burst into laughter. (Robert Fisk, "Egypt: Death throes of a dictatorship," Sunday, 30 January 2011, The Independent)

Blog Update: New Issues, New Sites

Events in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt require a few changes to the blogs I read and recommend.  I have added the following:

• Al Jazeera Transparency Unit
• Arabist
• Blog Stephen A. Cook (CFR)
• Democracy Arsenal
• EAWorld View
• Lede (New York Times)
• Mark Lynch (FP)
• Octavia Nasr / Blog

Après moi le déluge?

An apocryphal comment by Louis XV, but perhaps the dismissal of Turgot, Calonne, Brienne, or Necker (that is the rearrangement of the chairs on the deck of the Titannic) might be the better historical metaphor to today's news from Egypt.

• 1776 Louis XVI dismisses his finance minister, Turgot 
• 1786 August 20: Finance minister Calonne informs Louis that the royal finances are insolvent 
• April 8: Louis dismisses both Calonne & the keeper of the seals, or minister of justice, Miromesnil, in an attempt to break the impasse.
• April 30: The Archbishop of Toulouse & vocal leader of the higher clergy, Loménie de Brienne is appointed chief minister of state 
• 1788 June: Outcry over the enforced reforms ensues, & courts across France refuse to sit 
• July 5: Brienne begins to consider calling an Estates-General 
• Late August: Brienne resigns, & Jacques Necker replaces him as Minister of Finance.
• 1789 June 30: Large crowd storms left bank prison & frees mutinous French Guards 
• July 11: Necker dismissed by Louis; populace sack the monasteries, ransack aristocrats homes in search of food & weapons 
• July 14: Storming of the Bastille(adapted from Timeline of the French Revolution)
• 2011 Jan. 29. Mubarak appoints the former head of Egyptian military intelligence (Omar Suleiman) his vice president (and therefore likely successor). He appoints the Air Force Chief of Staff (Ahmad Shafiq) as prime minister. ("Mubarak’s Response to Demand for end of Military Rule," 01/29/2011, Informed Comment by Juan Cole)

Wild in the Streets (1968, 2011)




Is youth rebellion always good or always bad?

• Some political scientists warn of the dark side of the "youth bulge." A study by Population Action International asserted that 80 percent of the world's conflicts between 1970 and 1999 started in countries where 60 percent of the population was under 30. ("The Arab World's Youth Army," by Ellen Knickmeyer, Foreign Policy, January 27, 2011)

Some indications of hope from the young protestors:

• Now Al Jazeera is reporting that young protesters have formed a human chain around the museum to protect it against looting. It seems for now that this treasure trove of human ingenuity and the natural world's wonders is in no immediate danger. ("Egypt (and Beyond) LiveBlog: Black Hole or Another Day of Revolution," January 28, 2011, Scott Lucas, EAWorldView) 

But the riot police are generally young as well (as here from Liberation Square, Cairo).  The median age in Tunisia is 30; the median age in Cairo is 24; the median age in Yemen is less than 18.  More than 2/3 the population of Yemen is under 24.  (source: 29 January 2011, "What next in Yemen?," by Ginny Hill, BBC)