Read Any Good Revolutions Lately?

[In the run-up to the run-off, I had been reviewing the past year's events in print and online. But, as I wrote the following, the Egyptian judges overturned the parliamentary elections (well some of them). What follows is not my comment on the current situation (counter-revolution?, coup?, just the messiness of transitioning from revolution to democracy?).  That will come later, if it is not beyond my abilities.]

As protests begin to achieve a critical mass again (albeit much lower than last year) in Tahrir ("Tahrir Protests Continue," June 6, 2012, by Hossam El-Hamalawy, Jadaliyya), I have returned to a few books written after the first flush of enthusiasm about the Egyptian Spring (there is a movie Tahrir - Liberation Square, which looks interesting, but I have only seen the trailers). Three books focusing on events of 2011.  For an outsider, not simply trying to understand what happened/is happening in Egypt, but how to understand the modern world, I found Ashraf Khalil, Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation (St. Martin’s Press, 2012) to be most revelatory. Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0 (2012) is mainly the story of the politicization of one person (albeit a very interesting and thought-provoking story).  Marwan Bishara, The Invisible Arab (2012) wants to jump straight to the commentary without enough grounding in the narrative (Bishara might have the grounding, but he doesn't provide the reader with it). Khalil, as a Cairo-based reporter for European news services, is both in the revolution and reporting on it. Intriguing chapters on Tahrir days reveal how the street protests actually created community (communities) more once the government shut down phone/internet communication, forcing everyone to speak to everyone else to find out what was going on on the next block. More than Ghonim and Bishara, Khalil roots the revolution in the past decade of Egyptian history.  As such, it appeals most to the mere historian in me.  See also, now a new collection of essays on this context ("The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest, and Social Change in Egypt," reviewed by Arang Keshavarzian, in mobilizingideas, June 13, 2012), which I suppose is my next port of call to read.

Finally, a very detailed reconstruction of the life and death of Khaled Saeed has been written by Amro Ali in Jadaliyya ("Saeeds of Revolution: De-Mythologizing Khaled Saeed," June 5, 2012 by Amro Ali, Jadaliyya)

Neither Feloul nor Islamist

Revolutions create their own sense of time and periodization. An article exploring why Hamdeen Sabbahi gained such support with a minimal machine behind him ("Why Did Sabbahi - 'One of Us' - Do So Well?," Jadaliyya [and Ahram Online], May 26 2012, by Ekram Ibrahim), notes that one of his chief attributes was that he was "neither feloul [remnant]...nor Islamist. Another is titled, "In the field of feloul, Shafiq rules" (by Rana Khazbak and Heba Afify, Egypt Independent, 26/05/2012). Another blog groups the votes of Shafiq and Moussa together to map the Feloul votes (which might surprise those leftists who were strategically voting with the latter only to see his candidacy slide into fourth ("Mapping the Egyptian Presidential Election," May 26, 2012, by Eric Schewe). But returning to Sabbahi; he is neither feloul nor Islamist because he is neither the candidate of a return to the Mubarak era (Ahmed Shafiq, currently in 2nd place) nor the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate (Mohamed Mursi, currently in 1st, although official results are not released). But Sabbahi is a self-described Nasserist, obviously a position of an old, very old regime, if not the old regime. In an election in which the 57-year-old Sabbahi can lay claim to the youth vote because he is the youngest candidate, everyone will be tied to the way pre-revolutionary politics were played in one way or another. The key is what politics they stand for going forward.

When French Revolutionaries created the Ancien Régime, post facto as that what they had been rebelling against, they created opponents of the Revolution which they called the Ci-devants (the "so-called").  The ci-devants were so-called because they were former aristocrats, whose privileges and social status were abolished by the Revolution (and the night of 4 August 1789). So there were no more nobles, but the remnant remained, at least in terms of those supporting the policies similar to or even the restoration of the Old Regime.

Which brings us to the Ancien Régime, the Old Order: "isqat al-nizam," was the cry to bring down the old "regime" in Egypt. But it was, by the vagaries of language, also the call to bring down "order." It is not surprising that many voters would seek to avoid demolishing order. The feloul voters, the ci-devants, are not simply those who benefited by the Old Order, but those who fear the absence of nizam.

Egypt: Vox Pop, Vox Populi

(based on al-Ahram polls; see "Reading
the tea-leaves" for the latest)

Yesterday, I posted a shout-out to Egypt on elections (that is, they often look uninspiring until one looks at the alternatives), and hoped they would soon have their own Nate Silver. Well, I found one. Issandr El Amrani today posts a useful analysis of the Egyptian Presidential Candidates and their prospects (based, of course on pre-election polling and positioning). ("My belated take on Egypt's elections," by Issandr El Amrani, The Arabist, May 24, 2012) If Aboul Fotouh or Sabahi would fit the view of those seeking change, that seems unlikely to be the desire of more than a third of the population.

Many posts, at least in English, are similar to vox pop journalism now running on Al Jazeera, etc. (see, for example, "Egypt Votes, At Last," by Wendell Steavenson, New Yorker, May 23, 2012). My own take from one such clip were women in line who stated (through the translation) that whoever won should take care, else they would vote him out next time. The revolution is not synonymous withe the elections. Day 2 of Egypt's first post-Mubarak presidential elections continues today.

Egypt: Vox Dei, Vox Populi?

Greetings, Egyptians. Welcome to the problems and opportunities of mass democracy. The process sometimes produces the debacle of hanging chads and the hung election between Al Gore and George W. Bush; and it sometimes produces the government of Il Popolo della Libertà party led by Silvio Berlusconi. But its value and veracity is never just in one election. May you long have the joy of psephology and may you soon have your own Nate Silver.

It is a serious time, but this must count as funny, yes?

• Iran has issued a new stamp to commemorate the massive turnout in the country's 10th presidential election held on June 12, 2009....
• "The stamp will be the symbol of the Iranian nation's unity and their massive turnout in the presidential election," [Iran's Minister of Communication and Information Technology, Mohammad Soleimani] added. ("Iran issues new stamp to commemorate election," 13 Aug 2009, Iran's PressTV)
  

mapping dissent: we still need a basiji map

Turkey's USAK/ISRO (International Strategic Research Organization) has put out a new report on the elections (reported from Page F30). Below is the map of protests.

thought for the day

from "[Rick] Shenkman: Why the American People Were So Easily Bamboozled by the Bush Administration," in Informed Comment, by Juan Cole, Monday, June 23, 2008

• As we head into the Fall campaign and listen to the debates about the war we should keep in mind the limits of public opinion. If we don't begin to address the problem of gross public ignorance there will be more Iraqs.
• One poll finding we should all keep in mind is this. Even after the 9/11 Commission reported that there was no connection between Saddam Hussein and the Sept. 11 attack 50 percent of the country persisted in believing there was. The implications of this are mind boggling.