Canaries or Red Herrings?

Though reviewer Worth is more pessimistic, I'll plump for it as reality for now:

•  Was the flowering of liberal Arab youth an illusion? Juan Cole, a prominent liberal blogger and scholar of the Middle East, thinks not. In The New Arabs, he argues that the upheavals of 2011 were the product of a new generation of activists that has already wrought deep social changes, and is likely—eventually—to reshape much of the Middle East in its own image: more democratic, more tolerant, and more secular.

Robert F. Worth, “The Pillars of Arab Despotism (review Essay),” The New York Review of Books, October 9, 2014.

Springs Eternal?

Barakat (Enough) anti-vote Algerians

"Eight Hopeful Legacies of the Arab Spring," by John Cassidy, The New Yorker, 14 April 2014. Meanwhile, signs of another Spring in Algeria?

Revolution as Model or Metaphor?

In May, Der Spiegel interviewed Emmanuel Todd, who "sees himself as an 'empirical Hegelian' who recognizes a universal course of history," about the emergent Arab Spring. Both Der Spiegel and Todd ransacked European history for the appropriate comparative model. For Der Spiegel it was "a breathtaking acceleration of history, similar to the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989." For Todd it was the cycle of phases, or, more darkly, that a revolution eats its young:

• "Revolutions often end up as something different from what their supporters proclaim at the beginning.... It took almost a century from the time of the French Revolution in 1789 until the democratic form of government, in the form of the Third Republic, finally took shape after France had lost a war against the Germans in 1871. In the interim, there was Napoleon, the royalist restoration and the Second Empire under Napoleon III, the 'little one,' as Victor Hugo said derisively." (05/20/2011, "Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate: A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution," Der Spiegel)

That last comment is a conscious echo of Marx's observation that history repeats itself, "the first as tragedy, then as farce" (The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, 1852).  If France, 1789-1871, seems a bit broad, in the third part of the interview Todd expands to all of Europe in 1848.

• The Arab Spring resembles the European Spring of 1848 more closely than the fall of 1989, when communism collapsed. The initial spark in France triggered unrest in Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Austria, Italy, Spain and Romania -- a classic chain reaction, despite major regional differences. 

More recently, the Syrian Protests, which most viewed at best as a "revolutionary situation," has now become viewed as entering a second radical phase.  At least that is the claim of "The Age of the Guillotine!" (Syrian Revolution Digest, September 18, 2011): "Ideologies will soon flourish, and compromises will be harder to reach, even between the revolutionaries, pragmatism is now more necessary and harder to attain."  2011 as 1793?

Comparative Revolutions: Part Deux

How do we interpret "revolutionary situations" and "revolutionary outcomes" (to use the Charles Tilly's language, "Conflict, Revolt and Revolution,"  European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford, 1993), ch. 1) of recent and current rebellions? Avishai Margalit, in a piece analyzing current pundits on the Arab Spring, notes that we often do so by choosing the wrong historical revolution.  Margalit asks, "Why were the Arab revolutions, especially in Egypt, such a shocking surprise to almost all who care?"  His answer is often because we have only one, or only one main, historical example of a "revolution":

• "We are in the grip of an idea about revolutions. The idea is the Bolshevik model (or the Jacobin one, if we go back in time), according to which a revolution worth its salt is the outcome of a centralized organization that acts under a unified command.... This idea is dubious when applied to Russia in 1917, let alone to other revolutions. It holds true for Russia’s October Revolution, but it does not hold true for Russia’s February Revolution. The latter, like those in Egypt and Tunisia this year, lacked a central organization. ("From Ground Zero to Tahrir Square," by Avishai Margalit, Democracy, Issue #21, Summer 2011)

Not only is his point worth considering, surely choosing any of the "sloppy" early modern revolutions before 1789 would also allow use to make more informed comparisons about those not lead by a centralized cadre (and castigating Libya, or Syria, or Egypt for not having the thing that we pretended they needed to have in the first place).

Others continue to focus on the "social revolution" model.  Lawrence Wright notes of "the martyrs of the Arab Spring so far: Some 200...in Tunisia...[;] in Egypt...840...[;] More than a thousand...in Yemen....[;] in Syria, more than 2,200..."

• "The protesters are not just bringing about badly needed social revolutions in their societies. By their moral example, they are redefining Islam and redeeming it from the savage caricature that bin Laden made of his religion" (“Two Questions at the Heart of Bin Laden’s Jihad," by Lawrence Wright, Bloomberg”, Sept. 8, 2011)

Not just, but also.  Time to dust-off the social revolution model or at least make a working definition.

Social Media Revolution or Old-Fashioned Social Revolution?

The events of the Arab Spring (and the wider events of the Summer of 2011) draw analysts to the comparative.  Thus, the editors of the Middle East Report note "the Syrian revolt of 2011...is the nightmarish opposite of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionary dream." ("Syria's Torment," the Editors, Middle East Report, August 10, 2011, Middle East Research and Information Project) One of these is not like the other. Such comparisons are the bread-and-butter of all those who search for the independent variable, be they historical sociologists or political scientists.  But the comparative is a game that historians must play if they are going to use terms to describe what is going on.  (Is it a revolt, sire?...)  And, indeed, the analysts tend to draw from the ready-made language of historical, even European revolts, to understand the present.  Thus, the same Middle East Report: "No rustic jacquerie, the Syrian revolt has leaped from town to town." ("Syria's Torment,") (Are, then, protest videos posted to Youtube the new urban cahiers de doléances?)

It might seem that recent media-drenched revolts are tailor-made for the linguistic turn - deep cultural analysis of modes of discourse.  And certainly there were claims at the outset that the Medium is the Message:

• "Yet another Facebook revolution: why are we so surprised?," by John Naughton, The Observer, 23 January 2011
• "Faces of the Facebook Revolution," by Lenora Jane Estes, Vanity Fair, 4 April 2011
• "Why not call it a Facebook revolution?," by Chris Taylor, February 24, 2011, CNN
  

Just a partial listing, shows how this quickly devolved to a meer trope.  Naughton revealed the formula:

• "The story is always the same: something unexpected happens in the real world; journalists notice that some of the people involved are users of the web/mobiles/Facebook/Twitter (delete as appropriate); the unexpected is then labelled 'the Facebook/Twitter/smartphone (delete as etc) revolution/protest/demonstration/election'." ("Yet another Facebook revolution")

Instead, what has dominated analysis is state-centered analysis of social revolutions, the type that developed out of the 1960s and 1970s from Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, and Charles Tilly. For Skocpol, state situations, not revolutionary ideologies, are most determinative of successful revolutions which she distinguishes as fundamentally different from unsuccessful ones.

•  “Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below." Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (1979), 4

And Jeff Goodwin reiterates this definition in his "narrow" revolution definition below:

• "Two definitions of a revolution: a broad one, where revolution is 'any and all instances in which a state or a political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extraconstitutional and/or violent fashion'; and a narrow one, in which 'revolutions entail not only mass mobilization and regime change, but also more or less rapid and fundamental social, economic and/or cultural change, during or soon after the struggle for state power.'” Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 9, cited in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution.

What is intriguing is that the language of the state-centered analysis of social revolutions has returned to center stage. Anne-Marie Slaughter has recently drawn a number of "lessons" from recent events in Libya in the Financial Times. "The first is that, against the sceptics, it clearly can be in the US and the west’s strategic interest to help social revolutions fighting for the values we espouse and proclaim. The strategic interest in helping the Libyan opposition came from supporting democracy and human rights, but also being seen to live up to those values by the 60 per cent majority of Middle Eastern populations who are under 30 and increasingly determined to hold their governments to account. This value-based argument was inextricable from the interest-based argument." (Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Why Libya sceptics were proved badly wrong," Financial Times, August 24, 2011)  And there are many analyses of contemporary Arab "social revolutions": see for example "Social revolution in Tunisia and Egypt" (Steven Adolf and Sadik Harchaoui, Forum Report, 11 February 2011).  Is this another trope or a useful recognition of what is going on on the ground?  Perhaps it is best to note that the link between the state political and the social is a useful metaphor, then and now.