Good Soldier Švejk in Damascus

As noted previously the character Bretschneider, undercover agent for the state police, in the novel Švejk, was perhaps the model for various mukhabarat in all authoritarian regimes.  The model is based a multi-national empire such as the Austro-Hungarian.  Does this apply to Syria?  Certainly the religious and ethnic regions on the borderlands are most volatile, and there are those among them who strongly dislike the ruling Alawites.  The protests have not been strong in Damascus.  But the secret police also dominate the (lack of) discussion in the capital.

Bretschneider watching for suspect views in the tavern.

• The resilience of the protest movement is not immediately apparent in Damascus. On Fridays, hundreds of plainclothes mukhabarat, or secret police, mill around public places. There are military checkpoints on the roads out of the city, and usually bustling markets and bus stations are empty. Suburbs such as Muadhimiya and Douma, where thousands have rallied in recent weeks, are now inaccessible, locked down by the army, with movements by residents severely restricted. ("Syria: In Damascus, uprising against regime brings fundamental changes," (Babylon & Beyond, LA Times, June 7, 2011)

UPDATE (role of informants, this time from Tripoli): "'The single most powerful tool the regime has is informants. That’s the tool we fear the most,' said an activist who uses the name Niz, one of the few in Tripoli who manages to maintain contact with the outside world on a secure Internet service." ("Tripoli activists plot revolt without Facebook," June 26, 2011, Reuters, re-posted Libya 17 February 2011)

End Game?

Battle in Misrata (see map) and siege in Mountains (Zintan, above) continues.  But the drip-drip of defections might signify another front:

• Eight generals from embattled Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's army have defected to Italy, the Italian Foreign Ministry told CNN Monday.
• The generals were accompanied by more than 100 Libyan soldiers, a senior Italian official with first-hand knowledge of and responsibility for the operation said.
• The Libyans crossed their country's border into Tunisia, where they were met by Italian intelligence agents, the official said. ("Libyan generals, soldiers defect; South African leader meets Gadhafi," by the CNN Wire Staff, May 30, 2011; see also "Over 100 Libyan army members defect from Gaddafi," by Deepa Babington, Reuters, May 30, 2011)

Gaming the System in Tehran

Presidents Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Even dictators, especially dictators,  need to remain popular (that is, they need a constituency). President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appears to have added his iffy performance in the last election, plus (+) the many protests since then, plus (+) street protests across the nearby Arab world (especially Syria?), plus (+) stalled economy, to equal (=) a need to change the system. This might not buy him new support (although Pres. Ahmadinejad is not an unintelligent political operative), but it certainly will bring him into conflict with the inheritors/watchdogs of the 1979 Revolution.

• Ahmadinejad also confronted the conservative majority in parliament by rejecting its demand for a new committee to oversee the parliamentary elections due this winter...
• This escalating confrontation between the president and the leader on the one hand, and the president and the parliament on the other is causing new cracks at the leadership level, effectively creating a three-tier system....
• The controversial Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who is Ahmadinejad's chief of staff, his main adviser and confidant, leads the president's team. They are the most rightwing conservatives; yet, because they are nonclerical and younger looking they seem bold in challenging the clergy. Mashaei is demanding an "Iranian republic" rather than an "Islamic Republic" – apparently in an effort to attract the young who protested after the presidential elections of 2009. ("Ahmadinejad has fuelled Iran's power struggle," by Massoumeh Torfeh, guardian.co.uk, Saturday 21 May 2011)

Taking on both the leader and Parliament might be a bridge too far. Ali Larijani, who was just reelected as Speaker of the Majles (Parliament) for another year, appears to have had coups in mind when he commented on Iranian history a half-century back:

• In a speech he delivered at a conference on the history of the Majles, Larijani said that the parliament is not supposed to be controlled by the executive branch. Referring to the late Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, Larijani said, "Mosaddegh's strategic mistake was that he dissolved the Majles. That laid the foundation for the [CIA-sponsored] coup [of 1953], and concentrated the power in the executive branch, which led to the Majles becoming powerless. Any country that commits such an error will either have a revolution or a coup. If the countries of the region had powerful legislative branches, they would not have experienced popular revolutions. Moreover, if the legal framework [to express] the popular demand is respected, there would never be a dictatorship. It is not an honor for the executive branch to declare that to develop the country it must control the Majles; this is the foundation for a dictatorship. But it is an honor when the legislative branch controls the executive branch."("Is Mashaei Next?," Frontline Press Roundup, May 26, 20110)

Beyond Tahrir Square?: the Dark End of the Street in Manama, Damascus, and Tripoli

A chilling report on Bahrain. ("Bahrain, Kingdom of Silence," by Toby C. Jones, Arab Reform Bulletin, May 4, 2011).  The comments are also evocative.

And there is a similar return to fear of informers in Tripoli. ("Fear of crackdown, conscription haunts Libyan capital," by Lin Noueihed, Reuters, May 7, 2011)

And of course, this has long been the case in Damascus.  I found the cartoon below at Syrian Uprising 2011 Information Centre.  Press cc: for subtitles in English. (Basically all the rabbits complain until in front of their leader, at which point they sing his praises, except for Brave Rabbit, who asks for more rabbit food.  This proves an unwise tactic.  Until....)

Outsiders View Asad's Syria Inside

Joshua Landis provides a link to this video made by two Hungarian journalists, Gergő Plankó & Bence Gáspár Tamás, who shot great footage inside Damascus. (“Nobody Is Free In The World” – Report From Damascus by Gergő Plankó & Bence Gáspár Tamás, May 4th, 2011, English subtitles) It begins with a regional overview of protests, or, rather, crackdowns, then moves to original footage.

The Two Michaels: Orientalist Prophets of Doom

Two of the high-priests of intelligence privatization and managers of the Chertoff group, "a security and risk-management firm," Michael Chertoff (former secretary of homeland security) and Michael V. Hayden (former director of the CIA from 2006 to 2009 and director of the National Security Agency from 1999 to 2005) trot out the old tribalist (e.g., those people are different) argument:

• Optimists can point to the fact that Libya is more ethnically and religiously homogeneous than, say, Iraq, but it is also more tribal than most Arab societies. As brutal as he has been, Gaddafi has still had to respect tribal dynamics to sustain his rule. Is the United States confident that the dominant narrative today, of democrats vs. oppressor, will continue to play out — and will not be overtaken by latent ones such as tribe vs. tribe, haves vs. have-nots or, worse, Islam vs. “crusaders”? ("What happens after Gaddafi is removed?," by Michael Chertoff and Michael V. Hayden, Washington Post, April 21, 2011)

They are correct to the extent that, yes, anything might happen.  But Hayden also used "the devil you know" argument on-screen as an "expert" on CNN last week.  And you can see the inklings of "the devil you know" qualifier gambit "As brutal as he has been...." In Libya, yes, there are tribes.In the Arab world, yes, there is Islam. But this sure has the hallmarks of a nationalist rebellion at the moment. Not that I know much about Libya; my knowledge of it is about the same as Hayden's.

Misurata's Importance Elsewhere

The third front of the Libyan insurgency - in addition to the siege of Misurata and that of Ajdabiya/Brega - is in the Western mountain region. The seizure of the mountain town of Yafran could be a sign of desperate times for the Berbers in the region. As one notes, "There is nothing in Yafran. If the rebels hadn't seized this border crossing, people there would have died of hunger." But rushing troops to Yafran, along with the fall of the border crossing Wazin and the sieges of Nalut and Zintan is not a good sign for Gaddafi's forces either. As Reuters correspondent notes:

• Libyan rebels rushed supplies on Saturday to remote mountain towns under attack by forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi, cheered by reports of gains for fellow fighters in the city of Misrata.  
• Two days after insurgents seized a remote border crossing with Tunisia and raised the pre-Gaddafi flag, people queued in cars to bring food and gasoline from the neighbouring country into the area known as the Western Mountains.
• "The fact that we control this border gate means we have broken the isolation of the mountain region after several weeks," one rebel, who gave his name as Ezsine, said. ("Libyan rebels rush aid to besieged mountain towns," Apr 23, 2011, by Tarek Amara, Reuters)

Who Controls the Mountain, Controls the Valley?

Wazin (Wazen) is a small border post. But put alongside Nalut and Zintan and it appears that the Gaddafi regime has a Berber (also known as Amazigh) problem in the Western Mountain Region. The Libyan flags flying from the seized border post suggest also that this remains a nationalist, not a tribal, rising. (Maps from "Libya Live Blog - April 21,"
by Al Jazeera Staff;  "Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day," New York Times, April 21, 2011)

From Both Sides Now

Two interesting perspectives on Arab Spring (not exactly an accurate term, but the best we have at the moment).

1) "A closer look at the unrest sweeping the Arab world" (Hürriyet Daily News, April 20 2011)  Summaries of the situation in each nation from Morocco to Syria from a Turkish point of view.  My favorite is the summary of relations with Iran: "Relations established: 1639, when the two countries signed a border agreement. First ambassador sent to Iran in 1835."  True: as long as you consider Turkey to be synonymous with the Ottoman Empire and modern Iran to be synonymous with the Safavid Empire!

2) "Revolution U: What Egypt Learned from the Students who Overthrew Milosevic" (Tina Rosenberg, Foreign Policy, February 16, 2011)

The Good Soldier Švejk in Tripoli (and Manama)

Bretschneider, undercover agent for the state police,
in Švejk, watching for suspect views in the tavern.

Jaroslav Hašek's Czech novel The Good Soldier Švejk (1923) notes the idiocy (or at least surreal behavior) of imperial Austro-Hungarian leaders and the secret policemen detailed to seek anti-monarchist views in the most unlikely settings. In Tripoli, according to a recent BBC report, the joke making the rounds is that they have run out of paint (to paint over the anti-regime graffiti of the post-17 February protesters).  An incident, evidently not a joke, is reported as follows:

• The latest trend was demonstrated in a public school for girls - the Quortoba High School in Hay el-Andalus district. Word quickly spread about what happened - "it's the talk of the entire neighbourhood", a friend tells me.
• You would be forgiven for thinking this next illustration of artistic expression is a joke, but it is not.
• Red, black and green helium-filled balloons have been spotted rising into the capital's skyline on several occasions in different parts of the city.
• The colours represent the original post-colonial flag of Libya that has become a symbol for opposition-held territories here. Reports suggest that when they can, security forces shoot the balloons down. ("Tripoli witness: Covert protests and black humour," 14 April 2011, BBC)

Suppressing nationalist rebellions, by those with imperial (pan-African, pan-Balkan) dreams, is perhaps like shooting balloons. Effective in the short run....

[This is not unlike, of course, the incoherence of the destruction of the Pearl Monument in Manama, Bahrain which has lead to the following horrific ironies in the following report:

• Quietly approaching the ring of defensive fencing surrounding a dead space, a Nepali migrant worker described in halting English witnessing the pathetic destruction of the Pearl Monument on March 18. In a horrifying accident, a Pakistani crane operator was crushed to death after being ordered to destroy the monument....
• [T]he central bank "canceled" the 500 fils coin (about US$1.3) that for years proudly displayed this symbol [Pearl Monument] of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) pre-oil boom past when the region was a British protectorate known mostly for harvesting pearls. 
• A cashier at Carrefour, the French hypermarket ubiquitous in the Gulf, said she was instructed to make the pearl coins disappear by simply tossing them in the rubbish bin after receiving them as payment from customers, ensuring the erasure of the bad memory plaguing the kingdom. (Apr 7, 2011, "Dangerous change rattles Bahrain," by Derek Henry Flood, Asia Times)]

Dueling Orientalisms

Libya flag seen during pro-Bahraini demonstration, Baghdad's Sadr city (Stringer Iraq/Courtesy Reuters, "After the Arab Spring on TheAtlantic.com," March 28, 2011, by Steven Cook, CFR Blog)

We have charges of Orientalism from all sides now, at least from the pundits.  Juan Cole notes that when he praised the translation of Thomas Jefferson into Arabic in a new edition, "Journalists [asked] me if there isn’t something Orientalist or imperialist about translating Americana into Arabic."  Cole responds, "translation of the great works of Western literature has been central to the Arab renaissance and modern Arab culture....  [Only] [w]ith the rise of Arab nationalism and Muslim fundamentalism from the 1950s forward, Washington was often seen as being on the wrong side of history by Arab authors, and that sentiment discouraged translation, especially of political thought." ("Thomas Jefferson in Arabic," 04/08/2011, by Juan Cole, Informed Comment)

Bernard Lewis, Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, evidently "regards a dash toward Western-style elections, far from representing a solution to the region's difficulties, as constituting 'a dangerous aggravation' of the problem, and fears that radical Islamic movements would be best placed to exploit so misguided a move." (Abdurraham, below, citing "A mass expression of outrage against injustice," by David Horovitz, Jerusalem Post, 25 Feb. 2011)

Najla Abdurrahman compares the argument that Arabs are not ready for democracy because they are either tribal, responding to sub-national loyalties, or likely to be influenced by supra-national, pan-Arab loyalties, (or pan-Muslim, see the Libyan-Iraqi-Bahraini loyalty in the photo above) as reminiscent of the earlier Orientalists.  Abdurrahman notes, "The 18th century English Orientalist Sir William Jones, writing from British colonial India, once argued that 'a system of liberty, forced upon a people invincibly attached to opposite habits, would in truth be a system of tyranny'."  ("Libya: Making something out of nothing," by Najla Abdurrahman, Al Jazeera, 07 Apr 2011)

While Orientalism-bashing is a game that all can play (and have done so ever since Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 1979), it is hard not to share Abdurrahman's outrage. We tend to be willing to speak in the name of the masses, "the silent majority," and we tend to explain them in terms of the last uprising.  That is, the people are tribal; the people are given to extremism, etc.  The people are seeking what they say they are seeking might be another meta-narrative imposed from without. But at least it is one that takes what people are saying on the streets, on the walls, and on social media seriously.

Western Libya Theater

The less reported war in the interior (Zintan, etc.).

Multiple Identities a Good Thing For All But Pundits: Age, Tribe, Nation, Religion

"Alaa al-Ameri" reminds us that this rising didn't begin tribal and it is unlikely to end that way.

• In the last few weeks, the word "tribalism" has been used extensively in the context of the Libyan democratic uprising – a spectre looming over the country, embodying the devil we don't know. This was first introduced into the public mind by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi during his address last month....
• Disappointingly, this image of Libya as a backward tribal society with no real national identity has been picked up and amplified by many western pundits and politicians – often as part of their reasoning why military and material support for the Libyan revolution is a bad idea....
• Which tribal allegiance was Mohammad Nabbous – a citizen journalist who established the independent internet television station Libya Alhurra in the early days of the revolution – serving when he was shot dead by a sniper at the age of 28 while reporting on the bogus ceasefire cynically announced by the Gaddafi regime on 19 March? ("The myth of tribal Libya," by Alaa al-Ameri, Guardian, 30 March 2011)

Libya and the USA: Juan Cole/Mark Lynch - 1; Andrew Sullivan - 0

While what I read in the past two months suggested the slaughter possible in Misurata and Zintan (where it may still happen, see Washington Post, dynamic/interactive map) as much or more than Benghazi, that Mark Lynch argues was a key feature in President Obama's council in decided to act.  But  Lynch is convincing on the thinking that went on in the White House (the key paragraphs are below).  And the second paragraph, the importance of Al Jazeera to how this all plays out, is as important as the first:

• My conversations with administration officials, including but not limited to the one recounted by the indefatigable Laura Rozen¹, convinced me that they believed that a failure to act when and how they did would have led to a horrific slaughter in Benghazi and then across Libya.... The administration...preferr[ed] at first to use diplomatic means and economic sanctions to signal that Qaddafi's use of force would not help keep him in power. The military intervention came when those had failed, and when Qaddafi's forces were closing in on Benghazi and he was declaring his intention to exterminate them like rats.
• And my conversations with Arab activists and intellectuals, and my monitoring of Arab media and internet traffic, have convinced me that the intervention was both important and desirable. The administration understood, better than their critics, that Libya had become a litmus test for American credibility and intentions, with an Arab public riveted to al-Jazeera. ("Why Obama had to act in Libya," by Mark Lynch, Foreign Policy, March 29, 2011)

And explaining the USA's lack of response to the crackdown in Bahrain is going to be hard enough in the coming months. Embracing change on the streets of Cairo ("Pics from Tahrir anti-corruption march," by Issandr El Amrani, the Arabist, April 2, 2011), Tobruk, Daraa and Damascus, or Manama will not solve Israel/Palestine; nor will it bring peace to the Afghan/Pakistan border. But it will make Al Qaeda seem a bit like Cold Warriors: fighting last year's/last decade's issue. This is a political take on the situation. (For a military take, follow tweets of CJ Chivers.)

Meanwhile: Syria, Yemen, Bahrain

Syria.  Protests here are more at the stage of Iran than Yemen (or perhaps I should state that the government is more in control like that in Tehran); but they are obviously significant.

• "Protests expectedly started after the Friday prayers in the country and honestly knowing the fist of the regime there, I am surprised by the [extent of] public reaction and also participation....
• "There were protests in Damascus, Aleppo, Daraa, Baniyas, Homs, and Deir El Zor....
• "Of course you can imagine the panic of the regime there, the live ammunition was used directly." (March 19, 2011, "The Friday of Dignity in Syria: The start of revolution," Egyptian Chronicles, by Zeinobia)

(Hamad Mohammed/Reuters, 18 March)

(Joseph Eid/Getty Images, 16 March)

Bahrain.  Here I might mention a story from the Vendee, a protest against the French Revolution in the bocage region in the 1790s.  The Vendeeans refused to go to their local churches after priests that refused the oath of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy were replaced.  Instead, many started meeting outside in front of a large tree in which, it was believed, an image of the Virgin Mary had appeared.  The Vendeeans began meeting in front of the tree at night.  And then they began meeting armed in front of the tree.  Finally, the government supporters (the Jacobins supporting the French Revolution) cut down the tree.  This always struck me as odd, as the Government/Jacobins did not believe in miraculous images of the Virgin Mary.  In any case, the point of comparison is that tearing down the tree did not end the protests, which went on to become a major armed rebellion (Charles Tilly, The Vendee: A Sociological Analysis of the Counter-Revolution of 1793, Harvard University Press, 1976). Anyway, back to Bahrain:

• Authorities in Bahrain have torn down the statue at the centre of Pearl roundabout in the capital, Manama, where pro-democracy protests were held for weeks....
• Al Jazeera's special correspondent reports on the anger sparked off by deaths in the recent violence....
• On Friday Sheikh Khaled bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, Bahrain's foreign minister, said the demolition of the statue was an effort to erase "bad memories". The statue that was demolished comprised six sails symbolising each of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, holding up a pearl, symbol of the pearl fishing heritage that was the economic mainstay of the region before the discovery of oil.
• "It is a kind of psychological victory for the protesters," said Hussein Oraibi, who works in telecommunications....
• Al Jazeera's correspondent in Bahrain, speaking anonymously for safety reasons, said the monument "was the centre of the protests for a month; it was seen as being symbolic of anti-government sentiment.  It seems rather strange that by removing it there is the thought that that symbolism will disappear ... [The destruction] is very symbolic of that final stage in the last couple of days of this huge great crackdown on the opposition." ("Bahrain tears down protest symbol: Government demolishes statue in the centre of Manama where anti-government movement has gathered," Aljazeera, 18 Mar 2011)

Libya Update: Saturday

Juan Cole notes an Aljazeera Arabic interview:

• Brigadier Gen. Safwat El Zayat (rtd.), an Egyptian military analyst and supporter of the Egyptian revolution, on the military situation in Libya.... Zayat said that pro-Qaddafi armor had moved up from Ajdabiya toward Benghazi in two columns, with the intent of breaching the rebel stronghold’s defenses and occupying the city center. The 32nd Special Forces Brigade, supported by tanks and led by Qaddafi’s son, Khamis, attacked on Friday and Saturday from the southwest. Another brigade, supported by tanks and heavy artillery and led by another Qaddafi son, Saadi, attacked from the southeast....
• Given [the French] air intervention, Gen. Zayat said, the strategy pursued by Qaddafi’s military in the past week could turn out to have been an enormous error. The pro-Qaddafi forces are stretched out over hundreds of miles, far from their supply lines, and are vulnerable to aerial bombardment because they are exposed in the desert. He said that French Mirage jets could fire infrared-seeking air-to-ground missiles that would detect Libyan armor because its temperature signature differed from its desert surroundings, and so could zero in on it. ("French Jets Defend Benghazi," 03/19/2011, Informed Comment)

Guardian has an updated and interactive map

Misratah and Benghazi are under siege according to the current updated map (to the left is an earlier screenshot), and, again according to this map, Ajdabiya is noted as retaken by government forces.

The War on the (Libyan) Ground

Focus is rightly on continued fighting along the Libyan coast - in Misratah (Misuratah, Misrata)in the West and Ajdabiya in the East.  I note reports (Al Manara, translated and summarized in Libya 17 February) of renewed shelling in Zintan (Az-Zintan, Al-Zintan). Zintan was one of the first towns in West Libya to join protests. It is well South of the coastal road, and I worry there are few reporters on the ground in that part of Libya.  (Libyan maps, as before from Iyad El-Baghdadi)

Why Not Syria Too?

Video of clashes in Daraa, #Syria: http://bit.ly/fvHbn4

Andrew Sullivan's Chart Of The Day (Daily Dish, 17 Mar 2011) is The Economist's "interactive index of unrest in the Arab world," which can be adjusted by moving around the weights "The Shoe Thrower's Index" (Economist, 14 March 2011).  Add of bit of literacy and Libya comes out on top. (Twitpic posted February 24, 2011, by rutevera)

Mapping Libya: Update

("Latest maps of Libya with Gaddafi vs National Libyan Council," Sandra from off the Strip, March 5, 2011) Maps (there is another for West Libya) are created and posted by/through iyad_elbaghdadi's Stream

Women and Revolt: Happy International Women's Day

• [T]his year, women across the Middle East and North Africa are highlighting their role in the protest movements that have toppled dictators in Tunisia and Egypt and appear on the verge of pushing through major changes in other places. Twitter and Facebook were filled with messages of support for the women of Egypt and Tunisia, as well as protesters in Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran....
• A Million Woman March was planned for Cairo's Tahrir Square on Tuesday, and activists in Beirut planned their own march against sexual harassment.
• In Iran, opposition leaders called on women to use the occasion of International Women's Day to take to the streets in protest of the ongoing crackdown against anti-government demonstrations. ("Middle East: Protest movements give new energy to International Women's Day," Babylon & Beyond, LA Times, March 8, 2011)

For Iran today, see "Live blog report of International Women’s Day events in Iran," by Saeed Valadbaygi, 8 March 2011(Posters from 25 Bahman)