The Two Michaels: Orientalist Prophets of Doom

Two of the high-priests of intelligence privatization and managers of the Chertoff group, "a security and risk-management firm," Michael Chertoff (former secretary of homeland security) and Michael V. Hayden (former director of the CIA from 2006 to 2009 and director of the National Security Agency from 1999 to 2005) trot out the old tribalist (e.g., those people are different) argument:

• Optimists can point to the fact that Libya is more ethnically and religiously homogeneous than, say, Iraq, but it is also more tribal than most Arab societies. As brutal as he has been, Gaddafi has still had to respect tribal dynamics to sustain his rule. Is the United States confident that the dominant narrative today, of democrats vs. oppressor, will continue to play out — and will not be overtaken by latent ones such as tribe vs. tribe, haves vs. have-nots or, worse, Islam vs. “crusaders”? ("What happens after Gaddafi is removed?," by Michael Chertoff and Michael V. Hayden, Washington Post, April 21, 2011)

They are correct to the extent that, yes, anything might happen.  But Hayden also used "the devil you know" argument on-screen as an "expert" on CNN last week.  And you can see the inklings of "the devil you know" qualifier gambit "As brutal as he has been...." In Libya, yes, there are tribes.In the Arab world, yes, there is Islam. But this sure has the hallmarks of a nationalist rebellion at the moment. Not that I know much about Libya; my knowledge of it is about the same as Hayden's.

Misurata's Importance Elsewhere

The third front of the Libyan insurgency - in addition to the siege of Misurata and that of Ajdabiya/Brega - is in the Western mountain region. The seizure of the mountain town of Yafran could be a sign of desperate times for the Berbers in the region. As one notes, "There is nothing in Yafran. If the rebels hadn't seized this border crossing, people there would have died of hunger." But rushing troops to Yafran, along with the fall of the border crossing Wazin and the sieges of Nalut and Zintan is not a good sign for Gaddafi's forces either. As Reuters correspondent notes:

• Libyan rebels rushed supplies on Saturday to remote mountain towns under attack by forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi, cheered by reports of gains for fellow fighters in the city of Misrata.  
• Two days after insurgents seized a remote border crossing with Tunisia and raised the pre-Gaddafi flag, people queued in cars to bring food and gasoline from the neighbouring country into the area known as the Western Mountains.
• "The fact that we control this border gate means we have broken the isolation of the mountain region after several weeks," one rebel, who gave his name as Ezsine, said. ("Libyan rebels rush aid to besieged mountain towns," Apr 23, 2011, by Tarek Amara, Reuters)

Who Controls the Mountain, Controls the Valley?

Wazin (Wazen) is a small border post. But put alongside Nalut and Zintan and it appears that the Gaddafi regime has a Berber (also known as Amazigh) problem in the Western Mountain Region. The Libyan flags flying from the seized border post suggest also that this remains a nationalist, not a tribal, rising. (Maps from "Libya Live Blog - April 21,"
by Al Jazeera Staff;  "Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day," New York Times, April 21, 2011)

From Both Sides Now

Two interesting perspectives on Arab Spring (not exactly an accurate term, but the best we have at the moment).

1) "A closer look at the unrest sweeping the Arab world" (Hürriyet Daily News, April 20 2011)  Summaries of the situation in each nation from Morocco to Syria from a Turkish point of view.  My favorite is the summary of relations with Iran: "Relations established: 1639, when the two countries signed a border agreement. First ambassador sent to Iran in 1835."  True: as long as you consider Turkey to be synonymous with the Ottoman Empire and modern Iran to be synonymous with the Safavid Empire!

2) "Revolution U: What Egypt Learned from the Students who Overthrew Milosevic" (Tina Rosenberg, Foreign Policy, February 16, 2011)

The Good Soldier Švejk in Tripoli (and Manama)

Bretschneider, undercover agent for the state police,
in Švejk, watching for suspect views in the tavern.

Jaroslav Hašek's Czech novel The Good Soldier Švejk (1923) notes the idiocy (or at least surreal behavior) of imperial Austro-Hungarian leaders and the secret policemen detailed to seek anti-monarchist views in the most unlikely settings. In Tripoli, according to a recent BBC report, the joke making the rounds is that they have run out of paint (to paint over the anti-regime graffiti of the post-17 February protesters).  An incident, evidently not a joke, is reported as follows:

• The latest trend was demonstrated in a public school for girls - the Quortoba High School in Hay el-Andalus district. Word quickly spread about what happened - "it's the talk of the entire neighbourhood", a friend tells me.
• You would be forgiven for thinking this next illustration of artistic expression is a joke, but it is not.
• Red, black and green helium-filled balloons have been spotted rising into the capital's skyline on several occasions in different parts of the city.
• The colours represent the original post-colonial flag of Libya that has become a symbol for opposition-held territories here. Reports suggest that when they can, security forces shoot the balloons down. ("Tripoli witness: Covert protests and black humour," 14 April 2011, BBC)

Suppressing nationalist rebellions, by those with imperial (pan-African, pan-Balkan) dreams, is perhaps like shooting balloons. Effective in the short run....

[This is not unlike, of course, the incoherence of the destruction of the Pearl Monument in Manama, Bahrain which has lead to the following horrific ironies in the following report:

• Quietly approaching the ring of defensive fencing surrounding a dead space, a Nepali migrant worker described in halting English witnessing the pathetic destruction of the Pearl Monument on March 18. In a horrifying accident, a Pakistani crane operator was crushed to death after being ordered to destroy the monument....
• [T]he central bank "canceled" the 500 fils coin (about US$1.3) that for years proudly displayed this symbol [Pearl Monument] of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) pre-oil boom past when the region was a British protectorate known mostly for harvesting pearls. 
• A cashier at Carrefour, the French hypermarket ubiquitous in the Gulf, said she was instructed to make the pearl coins disappear by simply tossing them in the rubbish bin after receiving them as payment from customers, ensuring the erasure of the bad memory plaguing the kingdom. (Apr 7, 2011, "Dangerous change rattles Bahrain," by Derek Henry Flood, Asia Times)]

Dueling Orientalisms

Libya flag seen during pro-Bahraini demonstration, Baghdad's Sadr city (Stringer Iraq/Courtesy Reuters, "After the Arab Spring on TheAtlantic.com," March 28, 2011, by Steven Cook, CFR Blog)

We have charges of Orientalism from all sides now, at least from the pundits.  Juan Cole notes that when he praised the translation of Thomas Jefferson into Arabic in a new edition, "Journalists [asked] me if there isn’t something Orientalist or imperialist about translating Americana into Arabic."  Cole responds, "translation of the great works of Western literature has been central to the Arab renaissance and modern Arab culture....  [Only] [w]ith the rise of Arab nationalism and Muslim fundamentalism from the 1950s forward, Washington was often seen as being on the wrong side of history by Arab authors, and that sentiment discouraged translation, especially of political thought." ("Thomas Jefferson in Arabic," 04/08/2011, by Juan Cole, Informed Comment)

Bernard Lewis, Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, evidently "regards a dash toward Western-style elections, far from representing a solution to the region's difficulties, as constituting 'a dangerous aggravation' of the problem, and fears that radical Islamic movements would be best placed to exploit so misguided a move." (Abdurraham, below, citing "A mass expression of outrage against injustice," by David Horovitz, Jerusalem Post, 25 Feb. 2011)

Najla Abdurrahman compares the argument that Arabs are not ready for democracy because they are either tribal, responding to sub-national loyalties, or likely to be influenced by supra-national, pan-Arab loyalties, (or pan-Muslim, see the Libyan-Iraqi-Bahraini loyalty in the photo above) as reminiscent of the earlier Orientalists.  Abdurrahman notes, "The 18th century English Orientalist Sir William Jones, writing from British colonial India, once argued that 'a system of liberty, forced upon a people invincibly attached to opposite habits, would in truth be a system of tyranny'."  ("Libya: Making something out of nothing," by Najla Abdurrahman, Al Jazeera, 07 Apr 2011)

While Orientalism-bashing is a game that all can play (and have done so ever since Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 1979), it is hard not to share Abdurrahman's outrage. We tend to be willing to speak in the name of the masses, "the silent majority," and we tend to explain them in terms of the last uprising.  That is, the people are tribal; the people are given to extremism, etc.  The people are seeking what they say they are seeking might be another meta-narrative imposed from without. But at least it is one that takes what people are saying on the streets, on the walls, and on social media seriously.

Western Libya Theater

The less reported war in the interior (Zintan, etc.).

Multiple Identities a Good Thing For All But Pundits: Age, Tribe, Nation, Religion

"Alaa al-Ameri" reminds us that this rising didn't begin tribal and it is unlikely to end that way.

• In the last few weeks, the word "tribalism" has been used extensively in the context of the Libyan democratic uprising – a spectre looming over the country, embodying the devil we don't know. This was first introduced into the public mind by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi during his address last month....
• Disappointingly, this image of Libya as a backward tribal society with no real national identity has been picked up and amplified by many western pundits and politicians – often as part of their reasoning why military and material support for the Libyan revolution is a bad idea....
• Which tribal allegiance was Mohammad Nabbous – a citizen journalist who established the independent internet television station Libya Alhurra in the early days of the revolution – serving when he was shot dead by a sniper at the age of 28 while reporting on the bogus ceasefire cynically announced by the Gaddafi regime on 19 March? ("The myth of tribal Libya," by Alaa al-Ameri, Guardian, 30 March 2011)

Libya and the USA: Juan Cole/Mark Lynch - 1; Andrew Sullivan - 0

While what I read in the past two months suggested the slaughter possible in Misurata and Zintan (where it may still happen, see Washington Post, dynamic/interactive map) as much or more than Benghazi, that Mark Lynch argues was a key feature in President Obama's council in decided to act.  But  Lynch is convincing on the thinking that went on in the White House (the key paragraphs are below).  And the second paragraph, the importance of Al Jazeera to how this all plays out, is as important as the first:

• My conversations with administration officials, including but not limited to the one recounted by the indefatigable Laura Rozen¹, convinced me that they believed that a failure to act when and how they did would have led to a horrific slaughter in Benghazi and then across Libya.... The administration...preferr[ed] at first to use diplomatic means and economic sanctions to signal that Qaddafi's use of force would not help keep him in power. The military intervention came when those had failed, and when Qaddafi's forces were closing in on Benghazi and he was declaring his intention to exterminate them like rats.
• And my conversations with Arab activists and intellectuals, and my monitoring of Arab media and internet traffic, have convinced me that the intervention was both important and desirable. The administration understood, better than their critics, that Libya had become a litmus test for American credibility and intentions, with an Arab public riveted to al-Jazeera. ("Why Obama had to act in Libya," by Mark Lynch, Foreign Policy, March 29, 2011)

And explaining the USA's lack of response to the crackdown in Bahrain is going to be hard enough in the coming months. Embracing change on the streets of Cairo ("Pics from Tahrir anti-corruption march," by Issandr El Amrani, the Arabist, April 2, 2011), Tobruk, Daraa and Damascus, or Manama will not solve Israel/Palestine; nor will it bring peace to the Afghan/Pakistan border. But it will make Al Qaeda seem a bit like Cold Warriors: fighting last year's/last decade's issue. This is a political take on the situation. (For a military take, follow tweets of CJ Chivers.)