Revolution as Model or Metaphor?

In May, Der Spiegel interviewed Emmanuel Todd, who "sees himself as an 'empirical Hegelian' who recognizes a universal course of history," about the emergent Arab Spring. Both Der Spiegel and Todd ransacked European history for the appropriate comparative model. For Der Spiegel it was "a breathtaking acceleration of history, similar to the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989." For Todd it was the cycle of phases, or, more darkly, that a revolution eats its young:

• "Revolutions often end up as something different from what their supporters proclaim at the beginning.... It took almost a century from the time of the French Revolution in 1789 until the democratic form of government, in the form of the Third Republic, finally took shape after France had lost a war against the Germans in 1871. In the interim, there was Napoleon, the royalist restoration and the Second Empire under Napoleon III, the 'little one,' as Victor Hugo said derisively." (05/20/2011, "Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate: A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution," Der Spiegel)

That last comment is a conscious echo of Marx's observation that history repeats itself, "the first as tragedy, then as farce" (The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, 1852).  If France, 1789-1871, seems a bit broad, in the third part of the interview Todd expands to all of Europe in 1848.

• The Arab Spring resembles the European Spring of 1848 more closely than the fall of 1989, when communism collapsed. The initial spark in France triggered unrest in Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Austria, Italy, Spain and Romania -- a classic chain reaction, despite major regional differences. 

More recently, the Syrian Protests, which most viewed at best as a "revolutionary situation," has now become viewed as entering a second radical phase.  At least that is the claim of "The Age of the Guillotine!" (Syrian Revolution Digest, September 18, 2011): "Ideologies will soon flourish, and compromises will be harder to reach, even between the revolutionaries, pragmatism is now more necessary and harder to attain."  2011 as 1793?

Comparative Revolutions: Part Deux

How do we interpret "revolutionary situations" and "revolutionary outcomes" (to use the Charles Tilly's language, "Conflict, Revolt and Revolution,"  European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford, 1993), ch. 1) of recent and current rebellions? Avishai Margalit, in a piece analyzing current pundits on the Arab Spring, notes that we often do so by choosing the wrong historical revolution.  Margalit asks, "Why were the Arab revolutions, especially in Egypt, such a shocking surprise to almost all who care?"  His answer is often because we have only one, or only one main, historical example of a "revolution":

• "We are in the grip of an idea about revolutions. The idea is the Bolshevik model (or the Jacobin one, if we go back in time), according to which a revolution worth its salt is the outcome of a centralized organization that acts under a unified command.... This idea is dubious when applied to Russia in 1917, let alone to other revolutions. It holds true for Russia’s October Revolution, but it does not hold true for Russia’s February Revolution. The latter, like those in Egypt and Tunisia this year, lacked a central organization. ("From Ground Zero to Tahrir Square," by Avishai Margalit, Democracy, Issue #21, Summer 2011)

Not only is his point worth considering, surely choosing any of the "sloppy" early modern revolutions before 1789 would also allow use to make more informed comparisons about those not lead by a centralized cadre (and castigating Libya, or Syria, or Egypt for not having the thing that we pretended they needed to have in the first place).

Others continue to focus on the "social revolution" model.  Lawrence Wright notes of "the martyrs of the Arab Spring so far: Some 200...in Tunisia...[;] in Egypt...840...[;] More than a thousand...in Yemen....[;] in Syria, more than 2,200..."

• "The protesters are not just bringing about badly needed social revolutions in their societies. By their moral example, they are redefining Islam and redeeming it from the savage caricature that bin Laden made of his religion" (“Two Questions at the Heart of Bin Laden’s Jihad," by Lawrence Wright, Bloomberg”, Sept. 8, 2011)

Not just, but also.  Time to dust-off the social revolution model or at least make a working definition.

Social Media Revolution or Old-Fashioned Social Revolution?

The events of the Arab Spring (and the wider events of the Summer of 2011) draw analysts to the comparative.  Thus, the editors of the Middle East Report note "the Syrian revolt of 2011...is the nightmarish opposite of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionary dream." ("Syria's Torment," the Editors, Middle East Report, August 10, 2011, Middle East Research and Information Project) One of these is not like the other. Such comparisons are the bread-and-butter of all those who search for the independent variable, be they historical sociologists or political scientists.  But the comparative is a game that historians must play if they are going to use terms to describe what is going on.  (Is it a revolt, sire?...)  And, indeed, the analysts tend to draw from the ready-made language of historical, even European revolts, to understand the present.  Thus, the same Middle East Report: "No rustic jacquerie, the Syrian revolt has leaped from town to town." ("Syria's Torment,") (Are, then, protest videos posted to Youtube the new urban cahiers de doléances?)

It might seem that recent media-drenched revolts are tailor-made for the linguistic turn - deep cultural analysis of modes of discourse.  And certainly there were claims at the outset that the Medium is the Message:

• "Yet another Facebook revolution: why are we so surprised?," by John Naughton, The Observer, 23 January 2011
• "Faces of the Facebook Revolution," by Lenora Jane Estes, Vanity Fair, 4 April 2011
• "Why not call it a Facebook revolution?," by Chris Taylor, February 24, 2011, CNN
  

Just a partial listing, shows how this quickly devolved to a meer trope.  Naughton revealed the formula:

• "The story is always the same: something unexpected happens in the real world; journalists notice that some of the people involved are users of the web/mobiles/Facebook/Twitter (delete as appropriate); the unexpected is then labelled 'the Facebook/Twitter/smartphone (delete as etc) revolution/protest/demonstration/election'." ("Yet another Facebook revolution")

Instead, what has dominated analysis is state-centered analysis of social revolutions, the type that developed out of the 1960s and 1970s from Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, and Charles Tilly. For Skocpol, state situations, not revolutionary ideologies, are most determinative of successful revolutions which she distinguishes as fundamentally different from unsuccessful ones.

•  “Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below." Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (1979), 4

And Jeff Goodwin reiterates this definition in his "narrow" revolution definition below:

• "Two definitions of a revolution: a broad one, where revolution is 'any and all instances in which a state or a political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extraconstitutional and/or violent fashion'; and a narrow one, in which 'revolutions entail not only mass mobilization and regime change, but also more or less rapid and fundamental social, economic and/or cultural change, during or soon after the struggle for state power.'” Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 9, cited in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution.

What is intriguing is that the language of the state-centered analysis of social revolutions has returned to center stage. Anne-Marie Slaughter has recently drawn a number of "lessons" from recent events in Libya in the Financial Times. "The first is that, against the sceptics, it clearly can be in the US and the west’s strategic interest to help social revolutions fighting for the values we espouse and proclaim. The strategic interest in helping the Libyan opposition came from supporting democracy and human rights, but also being seen to live up to those values by the 60 per cent majority of Middle Eastern populations who are under 30 and increasingly determined to hold their governments to account. This value-based argument was inextricable from the interest-based argument." (Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Why Libya sceptics were proved badly wrong," Financial Times, August 24, 2011)  And there are many analyses of contemporary Arab "social revolutions": see for example "Social revolution in Tunisia and Egypt" (Steven Adolf and Sadik Harchaoui, Forum Report, 11 February 2011).  Is this another trope or a useful recognition of what is going on on the ground?  Perhaps it is best to note that the link between the state political and the social is a useful metaphor, then and now.

You write Khadafi, I write Qaddafi, Let's Call the Whole Thing....

Perhaps we will only need it for the history books now.  But, for the record: "A much-circulated 2009 ABCNews.com story found 112 different ways to render the Libyan leader's last name in the Latin alphabet, used in English and most other Western European languages. But, according to this passport, and presumably the Libyan man himself, the accurate Latinized spelling is one of the least commonly used of those 112: Gathafi." (Max Fish, The Atlantic, August 24, 2011, "Rebel Discovers Qaddafi Passport, Real Spelling of Leader's Name")

Surely Juan Cole Deserves Some Credit Too

Tripoli, 22 August (see Immoral Minority, etc.)

Great article by Juan Cole ("Top Ten Myths about the Libya War," 08/22/2011, Informed Comment) who surely gets to take a bow for not only supporting Libyan FF, but supporting the limited air support by the US/UK/France/Nato since before its inception.  From my, admittedly circumscribed view, I would only question 2 of his myths:

1. " The United States led the charge to war. There is no evidence for this allegation whatsoever."  Doesn't this go against the Lizza, New Yorker article which stated, some months ago: "Nonetheless, Obama may be moving toward something resembling a doctrine. One of his advisers described the President’s actions in Libya as 'leading from behind'"? ("The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy," by Ryan Lizza, New Yorker, May 2, 2011)  Lizza's article (and the adviser) might be wrong, but I don't recall Mr. Cole taking them to task earlier.
2. "The Libyan Revolution was a civil war. It was not, if by that is meant a fight between two big groups within the body politic."  This is more a judgement call.  Charles Tilly's definition of a revolution is when two groups of elites appeal to non-elites and the two blocks fight to control state apparatus.  In a revolutionary situation,civil wars often are a stage.  That appears to have happened over the past few months.  I think Cole rightly wants to show that Qaddafi's support among non-elites was not that strong.  I agree.  But, for as long as it lasts, I think we can term this a civil war, because Qaddafi did have some, if limited, support

Those are my caveats to an otherwise outstanding string of great articles on Libya.  Which is why Informed Comment is on My Blog List to the left of this blog.

So What Will Green Square Be Called Next Week? (Update: That was quick, now we know)
From ABC

• Rebel forces are surrounding the Gadhafi compound, Bab al Aziziya, a representative of the rebel government told ABC News.
• Mohamad al Akari, a Transitional National Council advisor, said that if Libyan strongman Moammar Gadhafi is still in Tripoli, they believe he is in Bab al Aziziya.
• "Tonight it's over," Akari said.
• Libyan rebel forces are now in Green Square in the heart of Tripoli, according to multiple reports, clashing with government forces. ("Libyan Rebels Say They Have Captured Two of Gadhafi's Sons in Tripoli," by OLIVIA KATRANDJIAN and JEFFREY KOFMAN, ABC News, Aug. 21, 2011)

Update: "Libyan rebels: Unit protecting Gadhafi surrenders," by KARIN LAUB, Associated Press, Updated: 6:36 p.m. Sunday, Aug. 21, 2011)

• TRIPOLI, Libya — A senior rebel official says the military unit in charge of protecting Moammar Gadhafi and the capital Tripoli has surrendered.
• Mahmoud Shammam, the rebel minister of information, told the Associated Press on Sunday that the unit commander "has joined the revolution and ordered his soldiers to drop their weapons."

Update 2: It turns out it has now been renamed, at least in the popular mind, from Green to Martyrs' Square!  That was quick.

Map and Video Show the Rapid Change in Libya

Al Jazeera Maps the Progress of Freedom Fighters in Libya


While an impromptu street demonstration in Tripoli (Al-Dhul Street August 21, 2011) suggests the rapidity (fluidity?) of the change.

"Is it a Revolt?"  "No, Sire, It is a Revolution."


I'm not sure even blogs can keep up.  Sky News Live with its 5 minute news updates might be needed to keep abreast of the race to Gate 27 and beyond.  almost certainly they have seized Mayah, passing Tripoli's defense ring, and moved into parts of the capital from the West.  And the East?

The Latest from NYTimes Lede Blog:

• 5:14 P.M. | Rebels Claim to Capture Qaddafi's Son, Seif al-Islam. The head of Libya's rebel government, the National Transitional Council, just told Al Jazeera that Seif al-Islam el-Qaddafi, the Libyan leader's influential son, has been captured, Reuters reports....
• 4:57 P.M. | Qaddafi's Guards Reportedly Surrender.  Although there is no word yet on where Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi is, the rebel leadership in Benghazi told Al Arabiya that his security guards have surrendered, Reuters reports.

Time and the Devil...: The Map Tells a Tale in Western Libya

17 August 2011

17 March 2011

This map (left), via Informed Comment (courtesy Iyad Elbaghdadi), gives an idea of what Col Ghaddafi is up against in Western Libya ("Qaddafi Explores Routes to Flee Libya as Rebels Advance," 08/18/2011 by Juan Cole).  Contrast it with the, admittedly more schematic, map to the right (below) from exactly five months earlier.  The story has been one of small villages and crossroads.  But the mountain ridge in the interior is now almost entirely filled with the flags of the opposition TNC.  And now the routes to Tripoli from the West and the South are at the very least contested.  (Juan Cole also reports, "[i]n Sabratha to the west of Zawiya, the Free Libya forces not only completely subdued the city but they also captured the military base and transferred to themselves all the weapons in it.") Most Libyans live in Tripoli and the situation there is uncertain.  But the map suggests the outcome no longer is.

Now: Zawiyah, 18 August 2011

Then: Zawiyah, 11 March 2011

And the latest?: "Libya rebels seize Zawiyah oil refinery." (Aug 18, 2011, by Ulf Laessing and Yvonne Bell, National Post)

Crowdsourcing Fasfous and Mukhabarat

Notes on the Secret Police (mukhabarat) and Informants (fasfous) inside and outside Syria, even from form Mukhabarat themselves:

• Among [those fleeing from Syria to Turkey] last week was a 25-year-old officer with the Mukhabarat secret police, who described how officers were increasingly unhappy at being ordered to kill unarmed protesters.
• "They were all feeling like me. They were all afraid like me but knew they would be killed if they left or if they refused orders," he said.
• Instead they tried to aim their shots in the air.
• He also described bringing protesters – some as young as 13 – into police stations where they were beaten for the entertainment of senior officers. ("Iran snipers in Syria as part of crackdown," Rob Crilly, from Yayladagi, near the Turkish-Syrian border, 15 Aug 2011, The Telegraph)

This particular former Mukhabarat had not revealed his identity to fellow camp dwellers.  But Syrians are starting to make lists of those still working inside Syria.

• In communities across Syria, activists are circulating lists of local government informers....
• Activists insist that the purpose of publishing the lists...is to pressure and isolate those who inform on their neighbours rather than to initiate vigilante justice....
• The regime in Syria has always relied on a network of paid informants – often known as fasfous – to keep the population under control....
• According to one protester from the central Damascus neighbourhood of Midan, being associated with the secret police, or mukhabarat, offered protection, status and a source of income before the protests began. ("Syrian activists name regime informers,", by Abigail Fielding-Smith in Beirut, Financial Times July 28, 2011)

Of course, the terms themselves are of shifting meaning and import (neither official police, nor secret). At least they tend to dress the part, as if in a "B" movie.

• Mind you that English phrase—”secret police”—is doubly misleading when applied to Syria’s cops.... [T]he “Mukhabarat,” [is] a catch-all term uttered only in hushed tones, which encompasses a multitude of agencies with responsibilities like “political security” or “internal security.” In Bashar Assad’s Syria, the Mukhabarat are nothing less than a professional bureaucracy specializing in the production and dissemination of fear....
• The Mukhabarat’s agents are everywhere, inescapable in their unofficial uniform of black leather jackets and dress pants.  That they are easily recognizable points to the second misleading aspect of describing them as “secret police”: Much of the power of the Mukhabarat lies not in its secrecy, but in its visibility. Its personnel mingle with pedestrians on crowded streets, sit in cafes, or just stand on street corners, watching. ("Life Among Syria’s Not-So-Secret Police," by Jonathan Panter, Jasine Report, 14 July 2011)

Combined Action on Several Fronts in Western Libya


Great map from @k_thos, courtesy of Libya 17 February ("Map: Libya last updated August 14," 15 August 2011), which also notes that Libya’s interior minister, Nassr al-Mabrouk Abdullah and family arrived in Cairo signally a possible defection, and includes the second of Al Jazeera’s Zeina Khodr's amazing reports from Zawiyah  ("Video: Revolutionaries say they control 70% of Zawiyah," 15 August 2011.  For the latter, note the bridge which FF control (or at least are huddled under).  That is one of the last two supply lines to Tripoli.  Perhaps Mr. al-Mabrouk Abdullah knows something.

Certainly, a comment in Al Jazeera's Live Blog a couple days ago, is another tea leave about the endgame.

• Speaking from a prisoner of war camp in the rebel enclave of Misrata, Colonel Wissam Miland said Gaddafi's military hangs together through coercion and mercenary-enforced martial law, but that infighting is rife.
• "I think it will soon collapse," he said, offering a rare glimpse inside Gaddafi's three-pronged loyalist force, made of up army regulars, militia fighters and mercenaries....
• "Within my unit there were a lot of mercenaries," Miland said. "But they are not fighting with the army -- they surround the army. They don't let anyone fall back. If you retreat, they will kill you." ("Saturday, August 13, 2011 - 15:20 - Libya," Al Jazeera Live Blog)

Turns out that the FF Opposition is not the only group with splits and divisions.

The Whole World Is/Will Be/Should Be/Can Be Watching

Interesting story on Local Coordination Committees in Syria on Morning Edition, NPR.  Links to left include now Local Coordination Committees of Syria, and the LCC are now one of the main conduits of news out of that country.

Our (noncombatant) Ears and Eyes On the Ground

Terry Gross's Fresh Air Interview with C.J. Chivers is much recommended. As is his website and his Twitter page (on our list to the left).

The Sedition Incident Would Be A Good Name For A Band

Iran's Revolutionary Guard commander, Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafar, appears to use the official term for the Green Revolution:

Greenery or Shrubbery: You Decide

• "Members of the reformist camp who have not crossed the red lines can naturally participate in political campaigns," he said. "However, Mr. Khatami's success in his activities depends on his stances. Mr. Khatami [former President Mohammad Khatami, elected to office twice with more than 70% of the popular vote] did not pass his test successfully during the sedition incident and he showed a lot of support for the sedition leaders." ("IRAN: Commander outlines Revolutionary Guard's muscular role in politics and economy," Babylon & Beyond, Los Angeles Times, July 5, 2011)

Good Soldier Švejk in Damascus

As noted previously the character Bretschneider, undercover agent for the state police, in the novel Švejk, was perhaps the model for various mukhabarat in all authoritarian regimes.  The model is based a multi-national empire such as the Austro-Hungarian.  Does this apply to Syria?  Certainly the religious and ethnic regions on the borderlands are most volatile, and there are those among them who strongly dislike the ruling Alawites.  The protests have not been strong in Damascus.  But the secret police also dominate the (lack of) discussion in the capital.

Bretschneider watching for suspect views in the tavern.

• The resilience of the protest movement is not immediately apparent in Damascus. On Fridays, hundreds of plainclothes mukhabarat, or secret police, mill around public places. There are military checkpoints on the roads out of the city, and usually bustling markets and bus stations are empty. Suburbs such as Muadhimiya and Douma, where thousands have rallied in recent weeks, are now inaccessible, locked down by the army, with movements by residents severely restricted. ("Syria: In Damascus, uprising against regime brings fundamental changes," (Babylon & Beyond, LA Times, June 7, 2011)

UPDATE (role of informants, this time from Tripoli): "'The single most powerful tool the regime has is informants. That’s the tool we fear the most,' said an activist who uses the name Niz, one of the few in Tripoli who manages to maintain contact with the outside world on a secure Internet service." ("Tripoli activists plot revolt without Facebook," June 26, 2011, Reuters, re-posted Libya 17 February 2011)

End Game?

Battle in Misrata (see map) and siege in Mountains (Zintan, above) continues.  But the drip-drip of defections might signify another front:

• Eight generals from embattled Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's army have defected to Italy, the Italian Foreign Ministry told CNN Monday.
• The generals were accompanied by more than 100 Libyan soldiers, a senior Italian official with first-hand knowledge of and responsibility for the operation said.
• The Libyans crossed their country's border into Tunisia, where they were met by Italian intelligence agents, the official said. ("Libyan generals, soldiers defect; South African leader meets Gadhafi," by the CNN Wire Staff, May 30, 2011; see also "Over 100 Libyan army members defect from Gaddafi," by Deepa Babington, Reuters, May 30, 2011)

Gaming the System in Tehran

Presidents Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Even dictators, especially dictators,  need to remain popular (that is, they need a constituency). President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appears to have added his iffy performance in the last election, plus (+) the many protests since then, plus (+) street protests across the nearby Arab world (especially Syria?), plus (+) stalled economy, to equal (=) a need to change the system. This might not buy him new support (although Pres. Ahmadinejad is not an unintelligent political operative), but it certainly will bring him into conflict with the inheritors/watchdogs of the 1979 Revolution.

• Ahmadinejad also confronted the conservative majority in parliament by rejecting its demand for a new committee to oversee the parliamentary elections due this winter...
• This escalating confrontation between the president and the leader on the one hand, and the president and the parliament on the other is causing new cracks at the leadership level, effectively creating a three-tier system....
• The controversial Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who is Ahmadinejad's chief of staff, his main adviser and confidant, leads the president's team. They are the most rightwing conservatives; yet, because they are nonclerical and younger looking they seem bold in challenging the clergy. Mashaei is demanding an "Iranian republic" rather than an "Islamic Republic" – apparently in an effort to attract the young who protested after the presidential elections of 2009. ("Ahmadinejad has fuelled Iran's power struggle," by Massoumeh Torfeh, guardian.co.uk, Saturday 21 May 2011)

Taking on both the leader and Parliament might be a bridge too far. Ali Larijani, who was just reelected as Speaker of the Majles (Parliament) for another year, appears to have had coups in mind when he commented on Iranian history a half-century back:

• In a speech he delivered at a conference on the history of the Majles, Larijani said that the parliament is not supposed to be controlled by the executive branch. Referring to the late Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, Larijani said, "Mosaddegh's strategic mistake was that he dissolved the Majles. That laid the foundation for the [CIA-sponsored] coup [of 1953], and concentrated the power in the executive branch, which led to the Majles becoming powerless. Any country that commits such an error will either have a revolution or a coup. If the countries of the region had powerful legislative branches, they would not have experienced popular revolutions. Moreover, if the legal framework [to express] the popular demand is respected, there would never be a dictatorship. It is not an honor for the executive branch to declare that to develop the country it must control the Majles; this is the foundation for a dictatorship. But it is an honor when the legislative branch controls the executive branch."("Is Mashaei Next?," Frontline Press Roundup, May 26, 20110)

Beyond Tahrir Square?: the Dark End of the Street in Manama, Damascus, and Tripoli

A chilling report on Bahrain. ("Bahrain, Kingdom of Silence," by Toby C. Jones, Arab Reform Bulletin, May 4, 2011).  The comments are also evocative.

And there is a similar return to fear of informers in Tripoli. ("Fear of crackdown, conscription haunts Libyan capital," by Lin Noueihed, Reuters, May 7, 2011)

And of course, this has long been the case in Damascus.  I found the cartoon below at Syrian Uprising 2011 Information Centre.  Press cc: for subtitles in English. (Basically all the rabbits complain until in front of their leader, at which point they sing his praises, except for Brave Rabbit, who asks for more rabbit food.  This proves an unwise tactic.  Until....)

Outsiders View Asad's Syria Inside

Joshua Landis provides a link to this video made by two Hungarian journalists, Gergő Plankó & Bence Gáspár Tamás, who shot great footage inside Damascus. (“Nobody Is Free In The World” – Report From Damascus by Gergő Plankó & Bence Gáspár Tamás, May 4th, 2011, English subtitles) It begins with a regional overview of protests, or, rather, crackdowns, then moves to original footage.

The Two Michaels: Orientalist Prophets of Doom

Two of the high-priests of intelligence privatization and managers of the Chertoff group, "a security and risk-management firm," Michael Chertoff (former secretary of homeland security) and Michael V. Hayden (former director of the CIA from 2006 to 2009 and director of the National Security Agency from 1999 to 2005) trot out the old tribalist (e.g., those people are different) argument:

• Optimists can point to the fact that Libya is more ethnically and religiously homogeneous than, say, Iraq, but it is also more tribal than most Arab societies. As brutal as he has been, Gaddafi has still had to respect tribal dynamics to sustain his rule. Is the United States confident that the dominant narrative today, of democrats vs. oppressor, will continue to play out — and will not be overtaken by latent ones such as tribe vs. tribe, haves vs. have-nots or, worse, Islam vs. “crusaders”? ("What happens after Gaddafi is removed?," by Michael Chertoff and Michael V. Hayden, Washington Post, April 21, 2011)

They are correct to the extent that, yes, anything might happen.  But Hayden also used "the devil you know" argument on-screen as an "expert" on CNN last week.  And you can see the inklings of "the devil you know" qualifier gambit "As brutal as he has been...." In Libya, yes, there are tribes.In the Arab world, yes, there is Islam. But this sure has the hallmarks of a nationalist rebellion at the moment. Not that I know much about Libya; my knowledge of it is about the same as Hayden's.

Misurata's Importance Elsewhere

The third front of the Libyan insurgency - in addition to the siege of Misurata and that of Ajdabiya/Brega - is in the Western mountain region. The seizure of the mountain town of Yafran could be a sign of desperate times for the Berbers in the region. As one notes, "There is nothing in Yafran. If the rebels hadn't seized this border crossing, people there would have died of hunger." But rushing troops to Yafran, along with the fall of the border crossing Wazin and the sieges of Nalut and Zintan is not a good sign for Gaddafi's forces either. As Reuters correspondent notes:

• Libyan rebels rushed supplies on Saturday to remote mountain towns under attack by forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi, cheered by reports of gains for fellow fighters in the city of Misrata.  
• Two days after insurgents seized a remote border crossing with Tunisia and raised the pre-Gaddafi flag, people queued in cars to bring food and gasoline from the neighbouring country into the area known as the Western Mountains.
• "The fact that we control this border gate means we have broken the isolation of the mountain region after several weeks," one rebel, who gave his name as Ezsine, said. ("Libyan rebels rush aid to besieged mountain towns," Apr 23, 2011, by Tarek Amara, Reuters)

Who Controls the Mountain, Controls the Valley?

Wazin (Wazen) is a small border post. But put alongside Nalut and Zintan and it appears that the Gaddafi regime has a Berber (also known as Amazigh) problem in the Western Mountain Region. The Libyan flags flying from the seized border post suggest also that this remains a nationalist, not a tribal, rising. (Maps from "Libya Live Blog - April 21,"
by Al Jazeera Staff;  "Map of the Rebellion in Libya, Day by Day," New York Times, April 21, 2011)

From Both Sides Now

Two interesting perspectives on Arab Spring (not exactly an accurate term, but the best we have at the moment).

1) "A closer look at the unrest sweeping the Arab world" (Hürriyet Daily News, April 20 2011)  Summaries of the situation in each nation from Morocco to Syria from a Turkish point of view.  My favorite is the summary of relations with Iran: "Relations established: 1639, when the two countries signed a border agreement. First ambassador sent to Iran in 1835."  True: as long as you consider Turkey to be synonymous with the Ottoman Empire and modern Iran to be synonymous with the Safavid Empire!

2) "Revolution U: What Egypt Learned from the Students who Overthrew Milosevic" (Tina Rosenberg, Foreign Policy, February 16, 2011)

The Good Soldier Švejk in Tripoli (and Manama)

Bretschneider, undercover agent for the state police,
in Švejk, watching for suspect views in the tavern.

Jaroslav Hašek's Czech novel The Good Soldier Švejk (1923) notes the idiocy (or at least surreal behavior) of imperial Austro-Hungarian leaders and the secret policemen detailed to seek anti-monarchist views in the most unlikely settings. In Tripoli, according to a recent BBC report, the joke making the rounds is that they have run out of paint (to paint over the anti-regime graffiti of the post-17 February protesters).  An incident, evidently not a joke, is reported as follows:

• The latest trend was demonstrated in a public school for girls - the Quortoba High School in Hay el-Andalus district. Word quickly spread about what happened - "it's the talk of the entire neighbourhood", a friend tells me.
• You would be forgiven for thinking this next illustration of artistic expression is a joke, but it is not.
• Red, black and green helium-filled balloons have been spotted rising into the capital's skyline on several occasions in different parts of the city.
• The colours represent the original post-colonial flag of Libya that has become a symbol for opposition-held territories here. Reports suggest that when they can, security forces shoot the balloons down. ("Tripoli witness: Covert protests and black humour," 14 April 2011, BBC)

Suppressing nationalist rebellions, by those with imperial (pan-African, pan-Balkan) dreams, is perhaps like shooting balloons. Effective in the short run....

[This is not unlike, of course, the incoherence of the destruction of the Pearl Monument in Manama, Bahrain which has lead to the following horrific ironies in the following report:

• Quietly approaching the ring of defensive fencing surrounding a dead space, a Nepali migrant worker described in halting English witnessing the pathetic destruction of the Pearl Monument on March 18. In a horrifying accident, a Pakistani crane operator was crushed to death after being ordered to destroy the monument....
• [T]he central bank "canceled" the 500 fils coin (about US$1.3) that for years proudly displayed this symbol [Pearl Monument] of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) pre-oil boom past when the region was a British protectorate known mostly for harvesting pearls. 
• A cashier at Carrefour, the French hypermarket ubiquitous in the Gulf, said she was instructed to make the pearl coins disappear by simply tossing them in the rubbish bin after receiving them as payment from customers, ensuring the erasure of the bad memory plaguing the kingdom. (Apr 7, 2011, "Dangerous change rattles Bahrain," by Derek Henry Flood, Asia Times)]

Dueling Orientalisms

Libya flag seen during pro-Bahraini demonstration, Baghdad's Sadr city (Stringer Iraq/Courtesy Reuters, "After the Arab Spring on TheAtlantic.com," March 28, 2011, by Steven Cook, CFR Blog)

We have charges of Orientalism from all sides now, at least from the pundits.  Juan Cole notes that when he praised the translation of Thomas Jefferson into Arabic in a new edition, "Journalists [asked] me if there isn’t something Orientalist or imperialist about translating Americana into Arabic."  Cole responds, "translation of the great works of Western literature has been central to the Arab renaissance and modern Arab culture....  [Only] [w]ith the rise of Arab nationalism and Muslim fundamentalism from the 1950s forward, Washington was often seen as being on the wrong side of history by Arab authors, and that sentiment discouraged translation, especially of political thought." ("Thomas Jefferson in Arabic," 04/08/2011, by Juan Cole, Informed Comment)

Bernard Lewis, Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, evidently "regards a dash toward Western-style elections, far from representing a solution to the region's difficulties, as constituting 'a dangerous aggravation' of the problem, and fears that radical Islamic movements would be best placed to exploit so misguided a move." (Abdurraham, below, citing "A mass expression of outrage against injustice," by David Horovitz, Jerusalem Post, 25 Feb. 2011)

Najla Abdurrahman compares the argument that Arabs are not ready for democracy because they are either tribal, responding to sub-national loyalties, or likely to be influenced by supra-national, pan-Arab loyalties, (or pan-Muslim, see the Libyan-Iraqi-Bahraini loyalty in the photo above) as reminiscent of the earlier Orientalists.  Abdurrahman notes, "The 18th century English Orientalist Sir William Jones, writing from British colonial India, once argued that 'a system of liberty, forced upon a people invincibly attached to opposite habits, would in truth be a system of tyranny'."  ("Libya: Making something out of nothing," by Najla Abdurrahman, Al Jazeera, 07 Apr 2011)

While Orientalism-bashing is a game that all can play (and have done so ever since Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 1979), it is hard not to share Abdurrahman's outrage. We tend to be willing to speak in the name of the masses, "the silent majority," and we tend to explain them in terms of the last uprising.  That is, the people are tribal; the people are given to extremism, etc.  The people are seeking what they say they are seeking might be another meta-narrative imposed from without. But at least it is one that takes what people are saying on the streets, on the walls, and on social media seriously.

Western Libya Theater

The less reported war in the interior (Zintan, etc.).

Multiple Identities a Good Thing For All But Pundits: Age, Tribe, Nation, Religion

"Alaa al-Ameri" reminds us that this rising didn't begin tribal and it is unlikely to end that way.

• In the last few weeks, the word "tribalism" has been used extensively in the context of the Libyan democratic uprising – a spectre looming over the country, embodying the devil we don't know. This was first introduced into the public mind by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi during his address last month....
• Disappointingly, this image of Libya as a backward tribal society with no real national identity has been picked up and amplified by many western pundits and politicians – often as part of their reasoning why military and material support for the Libyan revolution is a bad idea....
• Which tribal allegiance was Mohammad Nabbous – a citizen journalist who established the independent internet television station Libya Alhurra in the early days of the revolution – serving when he was shot dead by a sniper at the age of 28 while reporting on the bogus ceasefire cynically announced by the Gaddafi regime on 19 March? ("The myth of tribal Libya," by Alaa al-Ameri, Guardian, 30 March 2011)

Libya and the USA: Juan Cole/Mark Lynch - 1; Andrew Sullivan - 0

While what I read in the past two months suggested the slaughter possible in Misurata and Zintan (where it may still happen, see Washington Post, dynamic/interactive map) as much or more than Benghazi, that Mark Lynch argues was a key feature in President Obama's council in decided to act.  But  Lynch is convincing on the thinking that went on in the White House (the key paragraphs are below).  And the second paragraph, the importance of Al Jazeera to how this all plays out, is as important as the first:

• My conversations with administration officials, including but not limited to the one recounted by the indefatigable Laura Rozen¹, convinced me that they believed that a failure to act when and how they did would have led to a horrific slaughter in Benghazi and then across Libya.... The administration...preferr[ed] at first to use diplomatic means and economic sanctions to signal that Qaddafi's use of force would not help keep him in power. The military intervention came when those had failed, and when Qaddafi's forces were closing in on Benghazi and he was declaring his intention to exterminate them like rats.
• And my conversations with Arab activists and intellectuals, and my monitoring of Arab media and internet traffic, have convinced me that the intervention was both important and desirable. The administration understood, better than their critics, that Libya had become a litmus test for American credibility and intentions, with an Arab public riveted to al-Jazeera. ("Why Obama had to act in Libya," by Mark Lynch, Foreign Policy, March 29, 2011)

And explaining the USA's lack of response to the crackdown in Bahrain is going to be hard enough in the coming months. Embracing change on the streets of Cairo ("Pics from Tahrir anti-corruption march," by Issandr El Amrani, the Arabist, April 2, 2011), Tobruk, Daraa and Damascus, or Manama will not solve Israel/Palestine; nor will it bring peace to the Afghan/Pakistan border. But it will make Al Qaeda seem a bit like Cold Warriors: fighting last year's/last decade's issue. This is a political take on the situation. (For a military take, follow tweets of CJ Chivers.)

Meanwhile: Syria, Yemen, Bahrain

Syria.  Protests here are more at the stage of Iran than Yemen (or perhaps I should state that the government is more in control like that in Tehran); but they are obviously significant.

• "Protests expectedly started after the Friday prayers in the country and honestly knowing the fist of the regime there, I am surprised by the [extent of] public reaction and also participation....
• "There were protests in Damascus, Aleppo, Daraa, Baniyas, Homs, and Deir El Zor....
• "Of course you can imagine the panic of the regime there, the live ammunition was used directly." (March 19, 2011, "The Friday of Dignity in Syria: The start of revolution," Egyptian Chronicles, by Zeinobia)

(Hamad Mohammed/Reuters, 18 March)

(Joseph Eid/Getty Images, 16 March)

Bahrain.  Here I might mention a story from the Vendee, a protest against the French Revolution in the bocage region in the 1790s.  The Vendeeans refused to go to their local churches after priests that refused the oath of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy were replaced.  Instead, many started meeting outside in front of a large tree in which, it was believed, an image of the Virgin Mary had appeared.  The Vendeeans began meeting in front of the tree at night.  And then they began meeting armed in front of the tree.  Finally, the government supporters (the Jacobins supporting the French Revolution) cut down the tree.  This always struck me as odd, as the Government/Jacobins did not believe in miraculous images of the Virgin Mary.  In any case, the point of comparison is that tearing down the tree did not end the protests, which went on to become a major armed rebellion (Charles Tilly, The Vendee: A Sociological Analysis of the Counter-Revolution of 1793, Harvard University Press, 1976). Anyway, back to Bahrain:

• Authorities in Bahrain have torn down the statue at the centre of Pearl roundabout in the capital, Manama, where pro-democracy protests were held for weeks....
• Al Jazeera's special correspondent reports on the anger sparked off by deaths in the recent violence....
• On Friday Sheikh Khaled bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, Bahrain's foreign minister, said the demolition of the statue was an effort to erase "bad memories". The statue that was demolished comprised six sails symbolising each of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, holding up a pearl, symbol of the pearl fishing heritage that was the economic mainstay of the region before the discovery of oil.
• "It is a kind of psychological victory for the protesters," said Hussein Oraibi, who works in telecommunications....
• Al Jazeera's correspondent in Bahrain, speaking anonymously for safety reasons, said the monument "was the centre of the protests for a month; it was seen as being symbolic of anti-government sentiment.  It seems rather strange that by removing it there is the thought that that symbolism will disappear ... [The destruction] is very symbolic of that final stage in the last couple of days of this huge great crackdown on the opposition." ("Bahrain tears down protest symbol: Government demolishes statue in the centre of Manama where anti-government movement has gathered," Aljazeera, 18 Mar 2011)

Libya Update: Saturday

Juan Cole notes an Aljazeera Arabic interview:

• Brigadier Gen. Safwat El Zayat (rtd.), an Egyptian military analyst and supporter of the Egyptian revolution, on the military situation in Libya.... Zayat said that pro-Qaddafi armor had moved up from Ajdabiya toward Benghazi in two columns, with the intent of breaching the rebel stronghold’s defenses and occupying the city center. The 32nd Special Forces Brigade, supported by tanks and led by Qaddafi’s son, Khamis, attacked on Friday and Saturday from the southwest. Another brigade, supported by tanks and heavy artillery and led by another Qaddafi son, Saadi, attacked from the southeast....
• Given [the French] air intervention, Gen. Zayat said, the strategy pursued by Qaddafi’s military in the past week could turn out to have been an enormous error. The pro-Qaddafi forces are stretched out over hundreds of miles, far from their supply lines, and are vulnerable to aerial bombardment because they are exposed in the desert. He said that French Mirage jets could fire infrared-seeking air-to-ground missiles that would detect Libyan armor because its temperature signature differed from its desert surroundings, and so could zero in on it. ("French Jets Defend Benghazi," 03/19/2011, Informed Comment)

Guardian has an updated and interactive map

Misratah and Benghazi are under siege according to the current updated map (to the left is an earlier screenshot), and, again according to this map, Ajdabiya is noted as retaken by government forces.

The War on the (Libyan) Ground

Focus is rightly on continued fighting along the Libyan coast - in Misratah (Misuratah, Misrata)in the West and Ajdabiya in the East.  I note reports (Al Manara, translated and summarized in Libya 17 February) of renewed shelling in Zintan (Az-Zintan, Al-Zintan). Zintan was one of the first towns in West Libya to join protests. It is well South of the coastal road, and I worry there are few reporters on the ground in that part of Libya.  (Libyan maps, as before from Iyad El-Baghdadi)

Why Not Syria Too?

Video of clashes in Daraa, #Syria: http://bit.ly/fvHbn4

Andrew Sullivan's Chart Of The Day (Daily Dish, 17 Mar 2011) is The Economist's "interactive index of unrest in the Arab world," which can be adjusted by moving around the weights "The Shoe Thrower's Index" (Economist, 14 March 2011).  Add of bit of literacy and Libya comes out on top. (Twitpic posted February 24, 2011, by rutevera)

Mapping Libya: Update

("Latest maps of Libya with Gaddafi vs National Libyan Council," Sandra from off the Strip, March 5, 2011) Maps (there is another for West Libya) are created and posted by/through iyad_elbaghdadi's Stream

Women and Revolt: Happy International Women's Day

• [T]his year, women across the Middle East and North Africa are highlighting their role in the protest movements that have toppled dictators in Tunisia and Egypt and appear on the verge of pushing through major changes in other places. Twitter and Facebook were filled with messages of support for the women of Egypt and Tunisia, as well as protesters in Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran....
• A Million Woman March was planned for Cairo's Tahrir Square on Tuesday, and activists in Beirut planned their own march against sexual harassment.
• In Iran, opposition leaders called on women to use the occasion of International Women's Day to take to the streets in protest of the ongoing crackdown against anti-government demonstrations. ("Middle East: Protest movements give new energy to International Women's Day," Babylon & Beyond, LA Times, March 8, 2011)

For Iran today, see "Live blog report of International Women’s Day events in Iran," by Saeed Valadbaygi, 8 March 2011(Posters from 25 Bahman)

Mapping Awakening (or at least Relative Youth, Literacy, and Poverty)

The Arabist points to four really useful maps ("The new Arab Awakening," Le Monde diplomatique, March 2011, by Philippe Rekacewicz) including proportion of population with higher education and internet connection, proportion of young among the general population and their illiteracy rate (Col. Qaddafi's regime must have done something correct, as there is almost no illiteracy among the young there; is that correct?), national population and poverty.

UPDATE: Related graphics on population curve of each nation, unemployment, etc. (February 17, 2011. "Challenges Facing Countries Across North Africa and the Middle East," Washington Post)

"Oh my T V C one five, oh oh, T V C one five": Arab Version

Commentators most always associate recent Arab youth revolts with new social media, and have been termed them Facebook Revolutions.  But a study (published in Arab Media and Society, Winter 2010) hints of the role of more traditional media.  To learn what is going on, we could use some Al Jazeera reporting in the Midwest too!  As Hillary Clinton said, "Viewership of Al Jazeera is going up in the United States because it's real news." ("Hillary Clinton Calls Al Jazeera 'Real News,' Criticizes U.S. Media," Huffington Post, 03/3/11)

• Libyan TV services began in 1968....  Tripoli and Benghazi were the only two areas initially covered by television broadcast transmissions....  From 1990, satellite TV was introduced and offered Libyan viewers a more diverse range of programs, which they readily adopted.... These new channels quickly attracted local audiences and supplanted local TV services in public affection....
• Newspaper readership in Libya is lower than in many other Arab countries.... Radio broadcasting...does not have the popularity of television and tends to be used as a source of information about local events.... Television is the most popular medium in Libya.... Satellite TV news is especially popular among young people and they have been attracted most of all by the pan-Arab world channels such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. Libyan people have also displayed a high level of trust in what they see on television news, especially in news programs broadcast by Al Jazeera. ("News Consumption among Young Libyan Adults," Arab Media and Society, Issue 12, Winter 2010, by Mokhtar Elareshi and Barrie Gunter)
  

History/Political Science 101: Comparative Protests

Tripoli

• What we saw today after Friday prayers was a vociferous protest by anti-Gaddafi demonstrators. Then, all of a sudden, pro-government militia and police came in vehicles screeching into the centre of the suburbs, firing dozens of tear gas canisters and baton rounds. 
• The scene was chaotic as people ran away but then they came back, shouting anti-Gaddafi slogans. ("On the Scene," Wyre Davies BBC News, Tajoura, Tripoli, 4 March 2011)

Tehran

• Iranian police have fired tear gas to disperse opposition supporters mounting protests in the capital Tehran. A BBC correspondent in Tehran said large numbers of riot police and militia on motorcycles in the city centre broke up any crowds that formed. The unrest comes a day after websites close to opposition leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi said they had been jailed....The BBC's Mohsen Agsari in Tehran said by early evening the security forces appeared to have full control of the streets.The Basiji militia were chanting victory slogans, he said. (1 March 2011, "Iran: Security forces break up Tehran protests," BBC

Sanaa, Aden

• Yemeni troops killed four demonstrators and wounded seven others on Friday when they fired on an anti-regime rally in the north, officials and Shiite rebels said, as protests raged across the country. The shooting, which came a day after the opposition and clerics offered embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh a smooth exit from power, took place in the village of Semla, 170 kilometres (105 miles) from the capital Sanaa.... Protesters had taken to the streets of the nearby town of Harf Sufyan to criticise corruption and call for a regime change after 30 years of rule by Saleh, said the website. The Zaidi rebels, also known as Huthis, on February 22 joined anti-Saleh protests which erupted across the poverty striken country in January and gained momentum last month....
• In the capital Sanaa, massive crowds gathered for weekly Muslim prayers in a square where anti-Saleh protesters have been camped since February 20. "We will not leave this place until the fall of the corrupt and tyrants," said Yahya al-Dulaimi, the cleric who led the prayers. Organisers said more than 100,000 people were demonstrating in Sanaa on Friday....
• Meanwhile, counter demonstrations organised by Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) party were staged in nearby Tahrir Square, calling for dialogue. "No to chaos, No to sabotage, Yes to dialogue," their banners read. According to CPG leaders, hundreds of thousands were demonstrating in Saleh's favour across Yemen. In the main southern city of Aden, tens of thousands of mourners attended a funeral in Al-Mansura neighbourhood for two protesters killed by security forces during last month's violence, said an AFP correspondent. They carried banners that read, "Leave Ali, for the sake of our martyrs", while chanting, "The people want to overthrow the regime." ("Yemen army shoots dead four protesters," by Hammoud Mounassar, AFP, 4 March 2011)

Baghdad

Baghdadi protester greets police

• With a curfew on cars and bicycles, security tight and a recent history of security forces shooting, beating and detaining demonstrators, around 2,000 people were gathered for protests in Baghdad's Tahrir Square by noon Friday. Once again, they held up signs saying, "All of Us Are One Nation" and "More Services" and "No No to Corruption." Small protests were forming in several cities across the country, including Basra, Dhaqar and Najaf.
• In Baghdad, security was tight as police in riot gear faced the demonstrators, and it was unclear whether crowds would become larger following Friday prayers. Many protesters in the square said they were nervous about staying there considering violence that followed last week's nationwide demonstrations. And as they were before, entire neighborhoods in Baghdad - especially Sunni ones --were blocked by security forces who warned people not to join the demonstrations. ("Iraqis protest again, this time in 'Day of Regret'," by Stephanie McCrummen, Washington Post, March 4, 2011)

Embattled Brega

• OPPOSITION forces appeared to have repelled an attack by troops loyal to the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in the rebel-controlled east of the country.
• The Libyan troops had struck at the oil installation in the port of Brega near the city of Ajdabiya.
• Plumes of smoke were seen coming from Ajdabiya and witnesses said an arms dump there had been hit by air force planes, supporting the ground force advance on Brega. ("Battle for Brega as Gaddafi launches attacks," JASON KOUTSOUKIS AJDABIYA, The Advocate (Australia), 03 Mar, 2011)

• 1345 GMT: An Al Jazeera English correspondent has just witnessed a regime airplane dropping a bomb on Brega, where Qaddafi forces have been the opposition throughout the day.
• 1320 GMT: An Al Jazeera English correspondent and an eyewitness report on a disorganised, chaotic battle at Brega with the opposition trying to dislodge 200-300 regime fighters who are holed up in the university outside the city. ("Libya (and Beyond) LiveBlog: Battlelines Drawn," March 2, 2011, Scott Lucas, EAWorldView)

Wolves and Leopards

"We're at the Crossroads and this is the Time of Decision / Too much Informers... / Wolves and Leopards are Trying to Kill the Sheep and the Shepherd."  Dennis Brown, 1978.
And in 2011?

• A "mukhbir," or informer, knocking on doors in Cairo, Egypt is the same as the "etelaati" in the neighborhoods of Tehran, Iran. The Supreme Leader and his supporters are the same as those in Saudi Arabia, who use Wahabi rhetoric to marginalize secular, religious and ethnic minorities. Like the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, who uses force against protesters, the leaders of the IRI have no issue in exercising violence against peaceful dissenters, political prisoners, students or labor unions. Every day, hundreds of tortured prisoners of conscience rot in Evin Prison, similar to prisoners in the American-run Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay detention center. Just as the Israeli military oppresses Palestinian political prisoners, the IRI denies access to legal counsel and uses emotional blackmail, torture and murderous tactics on the opposition. We must recognize that the IRI is the essence of an oppressive, militant dictatorship, which sustains itself through its systemized spread of lies, violence and hatred. It debases the image of Islam and subverts the cause of global freedom struggles in Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and elsewhere. ("Build connections to oppose tyranny," letter to the editor, Daily Targum, Rutgers, by Farah Hussain, February 28, 2011) Farah Hussain is a Rutgers College senior majoring in Middle Eastern studies and comparative literature. [Quite an insightful letter.]