analysis of how's it going: posting from Helena Cobban

thanks to Juan Cole's Informed Comment for a link to Just World News by Helena Cobban

• This, from Reuters in Baghdad today:
  

Three female suicide bombers killed 28 people and wounded 92 when they blew themselves up among Shi'ites walking through the streets of Baghdad on a religious pilgrimage on Monday, Iraqi police said.

In the northern oil city of Kirkuk a suicide bomber killed 22 people and wounded 150 at a protest against a disputed local elections law, Iraqi health and security officials said. One security official said the bomber may also have been a woman.

The attacks mark one of the bloodiest days in Iraq in months...

• At the discussions I attended Friday in Washington with a group at USIP, and also with former Iraqi PM Iyad Allawi at Carnegie, a number of those who spoke warned with great intensity that the situation in Iraq remains very difficult for Iraqis, very politically fragile, and heavy with the threat of new waves of violence. Those who did so included Charles Knight and Rend al-Rahim at USIP, and Allawi at Carnegie.
• I record the latest spikes of violence with an incredibly heavy heart and no thought of schadenfreude. But they do, certainly, undercut the claims of those who have been crowing "the surge has succeeded."
• "Succeeded" for whom? Not yet at all for Iraqis, though the casualty figures among US troops are sharply reduced.
• Once again I urge that instead of looking at whether Bush's adoption of the surge "worked" or not, it would be far better to look at the costs and consequences of the fact that for 18 months now he has steadfastly refused to follow the excellent recommendations put forward by the Iraq Study Group back in December 2006.
• Those recommendations-- or something even more decisive than them-- are just as valid and urgent today as they were back then.
• But just look at the costs that have been imposed-- on the Iraqis, as well as on US citizens-- by Bush's failure to undertake the transformative and very urgent diplomatic and political moves that the ISG recommended.
• $180 billion of US taxpayer money... 1,110 US service-members killed... and an Iraqi casualty toll among civilians and security forces that is in the tens of thousands over the past 18 months.
• To which, today, add a further 50 Iraqi civilians.(July 28, 2008, "Bush's 'Surge': How successful?," posted by Helena Cobban)

"enemies with benefits"

thanx and a tip of the helmet to Washington Independent for pointing to Army of Dude for the following (the full article is worth visiting):

• Don't tell the pathetic non-serving members of the old media (and new media), but the surge wasn't wholly responsible for the drop in violence seen in Iraq over the last year. I have outlined the three main reasons violence has subsided, but one of the more important aspects is still largely misunderstood and mischaracterized by the punditry across the country.
• The 'awakening group' movement first appeared in Anbar in late 2005 (or if you're John McCain, it started in a time warp before and after the surge) and has since grown to a large, lethal force that battles elements of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq. That is usually where the media narrative leaves you, insinuating that these groups are patriotic volunteers casting out the demons of al-Qaeda. What they don't mention is both the original motivations for these groups and their history of battling American soldiers. One of the latest to operate (and propped up by my unit in Diyala Province) is the 1920 Revolution Brigade. I covered their nationalist history a year ago, citing their name was a throwback to the 1920 revolution to oust British influence. So this group in particular didn't start in 2005, 2006 or even 2007, but in 2003 for one reason: to attack and kill Americans. (Army of Dude: Reporting On Truth, Justice And The American Way Of War, Sunday, July 27, 2008, "Enemies With Benefits")
  

venn of shame

Click here for a text-only version.

uh, oh: this afghan thing is not going to be a walk in a (poppy) field, is it?

John Moore/Getty Images

POPPY FIELDS FOREVER A crop in Helmand Province in 2006. An unlikely coalition of corrupt Afghan officials, timorous Europeans, blinkered Pentagon officers and the Taliban has made poppy cultivation stubbornly resistant to eradication.

• On March 1, 2006, I met Hamid Karzai for the first time. It was a clear, crisp day in Kabul. The Afghan president joined President and Mrs. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Ambassador Ronald Neumann to dedicate the new United States Embassy. He thanked the American people for all they had done for Afghanistan. I was a senior counternarcotics official recently arrived in a country that supplied 90 percent of the world’s heroin. I took to heart Karzai’s strong statements against the Afghan drug trade. That was my first mistake.

Enlarge This Image

Véronique de Viguerie/WPN

• Over the next two years I would discover how deeply the Afghan government was involved in protecting the opium trade — by shielding it from American-designed policies. While it is true that Karzai’s Taliban enemies finance themselves from the drug trade, so do many of his supporters. At the same time, some of our NATO allies have resisted the anti-opium offensive, as has our own Defense Department, which tends to see counternarcotics as other people’s business to be settled once the war-fighting is over. The trouble is that the fighting is unlikely to end as long as the Taliban can finance themselves through drugs — and as long as the Kabul government is dependent on opium to sustain its own hold on power. ("Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?," by THOMAS SCHWEICH, July 27, 2008, New York Times)

since we have recently had a dispute over chronology of the surge....

...I thought this might be a relevant post

• In a presentation yesterday at the American Enterprise Institute, escalation architect Frederick Kagan repeated his claim that sectarian cleansing has not affected the drop in violence in Iraq. Kagan called it a “myth”:

The bad news from this perspective is that the sectarian areas of Iraq is still mixed. The good news is that the sectarian areas of Iraq are still mixed. And there is a myth out there that the violence has fallen because all of the cleansing is done. That is absolutely not the case.

• Watch it:

• Kagan makes the same claim in his new report, “Iraq: The Way Ahead“:

One of the persistent myths about the reasons for the success of coalition efforts in 2007 is that the killing stopped because the sectarian cleansing was completed. This myth is absolutely false. Baghdad remains a mixed city. The traditionally Sunni neighborhoods of Adhamiya, Mansour, and Rashid remain predominantly Sunni, and Shiite enclaves in East Rashid remain Shiite. Shia have moved into some parts of the Sunni neighborhoods, and many sub-districts within neighborhoods that had been mixed are now much more homogeneous. But the key components of a mixed Baghdad remain.

• Kagan’s claim is contested by major news organizations and the U.S. military’s own data. In December 2007, the Washington Post published the maps below, comparing the sectarian make-up of Baghdad’s neighborhoods in April 2006 and November 2007, and revealing the transformation of the city resulting from sectarian cleansing:

• The Post’s distribution of sectarian enclaves corresponds closely with these graphs, provided by Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), that chart sectarian violence in Baghdad between July 2006 and July 2007, which is the period in which the U.S. military escalation, also known as the Baghdad Security Plan, took place.
• The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq also rebuts Kagan’s mythmaking. One of the NIE’s judgements was that where some “conflict levels have diminished,” it was due to sectarian “separation.” (Think Progress, Wonk Room, "Escalation Architect Fred Kagan Doubles Down On His Claim That Sectarian Cleansing In Baghdad Is A ‘Myth,'" By M. Duss on Mar 25th, 2008 at 5:47 pm)

more problematic than his belief that Iraq and Pakiston share a common border

• McCain keeps boasting about being "right" about the "surge" and saying Obama was "wrong."
• Look, it is more important that McCain was consistently wrong. He was wrong about the desirability of going to war against Iraq. He was wrong about it being a cakewalk. He was wrong about there being WMD there. He was wrong about everything. And he was wrong about the troop escalation making things better. The casualty figures dropped in al-Anbar, where few extra US troops were ever sent. They dropped in Basra, from which the British withdrew. Something happened. Putting it all on 30,000 extra troops seems a stretch. And what about all the ethnic cleansing and displacing of persons that took place under the nose of the "surge?" McCain has been wrong about everything to do with Iraq. And he is boasting about his wisdom on it! (Juan Cole, Informed Commment, July 22, 2008, "Troop Agreement Misses Deadline; Provincial Law Misses Deadline; Bombings in Mosul, Diyala, Fallujah")

bombing is never a shortcut to winning hearts and minds

At least 13 Afghan police and civilians have died in two incidents involving international forces, officials say.

International forces have been involved in a series of controversies of controversies

Four Afghan police and five civilians died in an apparently mistaken air strike by international coalition forces in Farah province.

Separately, the Nato-led Isaf said it had "accidentally" killed at least four civilians in Paktika province. (BBC, 20 July 2008, "Coalition 'bombs Afghan police'")

why wasn't this on the tv news; in the newspapers, etc?

People carry photos of the anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr during a protest in Baghdad's Shiite stronghold of Sadr City, Iraq, Friday, July 11, 2008. (AP Photo/Karim Kadim)

BAGHDAD (AP) — Hundreds of followers of a radical Shiite cleric in Iraq have taken to the streets to protest a proposed security agreement between Iraq and the United States.

The supporters of cleric Muqtada al-Sadr say the proposed deal would lead to a permanent U.S. occupation of Iraq.

They held their protest Friday in the southern city of Kufa and shouted slogans such as: "No to America."

Such demonstrations have become a weekly event, usually following prayers held in local mosques on Fridays. (AP, "Some Iraqis protest security deal with US," 11 July 2008)

Things are better; can we go now?

It is the PM's first public suggestion of a deadline for US withdrawal from Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki has raised the prospect of setting a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq.

Talks are continuing on a new security deal, but the US has said it opposes setting any timetable for withdrawal.

The UN mandate under which US troops stay in Iraq expires at the end 2008.

Correspondents say Mr Maliki may have an easier time getting the support of Iraqi MPs by proposing a deal which includes a withdrawal timetable. (Monday, 7 July 2008 15:53 UK, BBC,"Iraq floats US pullout timetable")

the surge is...

...fill in the blank.

Here is the point: the surge of a 21st army against pipe-bomb insurgents will always "work," in the short run. An invading/conquering army has control of the air, the main arteries, and backup. Insurgents have..., well, time. Until the sides talk and recognize each other's strengths, then the situation that produced the insurgency--lack of jobs, ethnic cleansing, etc.--continues. Of course, the Maliki government will announce the success of the current program, because their continued "success" depends on American, well, continuance. Yet:

1. The insurgency is mainly against American targets, and our allies. Don't we expect at least some decline if those targets are no longer there?
2. The main reason for the decline in violence has little to do with our troops, and everything to do with walls, surveillance, etc., which has resulted in a MORE balkanized Baghdad, and a more balkanized Iraq. Which means, of course, that what we claimed we are fighting for (well the fourth attempt to explain what we were fighting for; remember: Get rid of WMD's?--fake; stop Saddam Hussein from providing safe haven for Al Qaeda?--fake; bring democracy to the Middle East?--fake {and ludicrous}), that is, a stable, unified government is, get this, NEVER GOING TO HAPPEN. Three separate governments, yes; three governments unified in a very loose federation, possibly. But the only thing these folks are unified in, is, that US troops need to leave. Now.
3. The longer we stay, the strong Iran is in the region.
   

'Weak institutions'

Millions in development money have notoriously gone to waste in the seven years since the fall of the Taleban, the BBC's Alastair Leithead reports from Kabul.

Afghan people on improving life

Many countries spend a chunk of their aid through the government or on a trust fund set aside to fund National Solidarity Programmes in more than 22,000 districts of the country.

Mr Eide believes more should be spent this way.

In Kabul on Sunday, he will outline to the government and donors that they have got to be more co-ordinated and to deliver development more effectively and efficiently.

"We also have to see how we can spend our money in a way that builds Afghan capacity," he said.

"We see how weak the institutions are - that we have to make sure we correct."

Corruption is a major issue and the words auditing and accountability will be buzzing around the room at the first monitoring board meeting since the Paris conference, our correspondent says.

The UN head in Afghanistan is trying to take control of an aid effort that many think has been missing the mark, when winning people over to the government, and keeping the Taleban at bay, is so vital for the future, he adds. (Sunday, 6 July 2008 07:27 UK, BBC, "UN to urge revamp of Afghan aid")